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Summary
Comparing reform of agricultural policy in Bangladesh, 
Chile, China and New Zealand, this paper derives lessons 
for countries contemplating reform.
In all cases reforms to farm policy were undertaken as 
part of overall reforms across the whole economy, started 
in response to a perceived national crisis and usually 
implemented by new governments with a mandate to 
make major changes. Political will is, not surprisingly, a 
necessary condition.
In designing reforms and their implementation, much 
depends on context, including external conditions such 
as world market prices. The scope for change, and 
certainly the sequence and pace of reform, may be as 
much a matter of administrative feasibility as choice.
Where outcomes are uncertain and state capacity limited, 
gradual approaches to reform that allow for learning may 
be better than swift and comprehensive -‘big bang’ 
- packages.
This working paper presents the first stage of a review 
of agricultural reform experiences within African coun-
tries, specifically Ethiopia, Kenya and Malawi. It aims to 
draw out issues for would-be reformers by examining 
the experience of four cases of agricultural reform, 
purposely selected as often being seen as successful. 
These are:
Reform of agricultural input markets in Bangladesh in  •
the early 1980s, followed by liberalisation of grain 
trading and the cancellation of several longstanding 
programmes of public distribution of grains during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s;
The impact of economy-wide reforms and counter- •
reform of land on Chilean agriculture from 1973 
through to the 1980s;
Introduction of the ‘household responsibility system’  •
of production and liberalisation of marketing in China 
starting around 1978; and,
Removal of price and other support to New Zealand  •
farming that began in 1984 and continued into the 
1990s.
This review seeks to answer the following questions: •
What were the conditions that created the impetus  •
for agricultural reform?
What factors determined the actual content of the  •
reform packages?
What challenges were faced in the implementation of  •
the reform and what lessons, if any, can be learnt from 
these for future reform programmes?
What opposition was there to the reforms and how  •
was this overcome?
What factors exerted the greatest influence on the  •
outcomes of the reform?
The country cases
Bangladesh undertook two waves of agricultural reforms 
between the late 1970s and early 1990s. In the first, the 
markets for agricultural inputs - above all fertiliser and 
irrigation equipment were liberalised. This led to falling 
prices, greater availability, and increased use of these 
inputs. Tubewells and pumps, in particular, allowed a 
major expansion of winter (‘boro’) rice production that 
saw increases in domestic supply of rice outstrip 
population growth and thereby drove down the price 
of rice. This in turn made it easier to implement the 
second round of reforms where the markets for food 
grains were liberalised and some large-scale programmes 
of food subsidies were ended.
Bangladesh benefited from phased implementation 
of reforms that allowed for learning, monitoring and 
adjustment to developments in the markets. Timing was 
important - and fortuitous, since the liberalisation of 
inputs took place just as international prices dropped, 
thereby more than offsetting the loss of subsidies on 
inputs.
Much of the impetus for reform came from domestic 
concerns over the costs and ineffectiveness of controls 
on markets and subsidies. Donors were also concerned, 
provided some help for research on the costs, and also 
ended up acting as a target to draw the fire of domestic 
opponents of reform.
Formal research played a role in revealing the high 
costs of existing policies. The numbers were fed into 
debate by cabinet briefings, policy seminars and by 
(leaked) press reports. People were aware that there were 
problems, but it seems the numbers shocked them suffi-
ciently to act.
Chile’s reforms took place within the context of 
sweeping changes to overall economic policy carried 
out after the coup of 1973. The first phase that lasted 
until 1975 consisted of gradual measures to liberalise 
the economy and open the country for trade, while 
cutting back on the role of the state. For agriculture, the 
main measure was the part reversal of the redistributive 
land reforms that had taken place in the decade or so 
before the coup, as some large farms were returned to 
their former owners. From 1975, economic policy became 
more radical in a determined attempt to create condi-
tions for business to invest. But after a banking collapse 
in 1982, more pragmatic policies were introduced that 
allowed some trade protection, some regulation of 
finance markets, and some programmes and projects 
that saw the government trying actively to stimulate 
investment and productivity.
Farming was affected by changes in land ownership, 
the more open trading regime, and by a reduction in the 
provision of public services. By the early 1980s the sector 
had adjusted to reforms and began to take the oppor-
tunity to boost exports of fruit, forest products, fisheries, 
and wine. The freer market had allowed some concentra-
tion in supply chains with large conglomerates then 
bringing in capital and know-how. From the mid- 1980s 
to the mid-1990s the farm sector grew at annual rates 
that were usually 5% a year or more.
Reformers in Chile were able to take advantage of an 
authoritarian regime that was determined to reform the 
economy to push through changes that favoured busi-
ness, albeit at the expense of workers and small farmers. 
But the path taken by Chile was far from being a blueprint: 
reform went through stages, as lessons, sometimes quite 
painful, were learned. The precise configuration of poli-
cies was worked out through interactions between tech-
nocratic economists - the ‘Chicago boys’- and elite groups 
within industry and farming, mediated by a leadership 
that was prepared to take unpopular decisions if 
convinced by the arguments.
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In the case of China, the reforms introduced after 1978 
marked a significant departure from previous economic 
policies. In agriculture, markets for produce that previ-
ously had been under tight control of the state were 
partly liberalised. Land that formerly had been worked 
by production units was leased out to households who 
a few years later were even allowed to rent out their plots. 
Labour markets were eventually allowed.
The results have been striking: per capita agricultural 
output more than doubled in the two decades following 
reforms, and rural incomes have risen considerably 
making a big dent in poverty. Not all of the increases in 
income can be attributed to agriculture: jobs in 
burgeoning rural industries and remittances from the 
increasing numbers of migrants from rural areas have 
contributed. But some of those changes have been linked 
to reforms in agriculture.
Although at first sight China made dramatic reforms, 
the process was more gradual, based on experimentation 
and pragmatic choices. The reformers of the late 1970s 
could draw on the results of tolerated trials in small areas 
carried out in the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, once the 
initial round of reforms of 1978–1979 brought gains that 
exceeded expectations, policy-makers were thus encour-
aged to introduce further rounds of reforms from 1984 
onwards that deepened and strengthened the initial 
changes.
For much of the twentieth century, New Zealand 
farming suffered negative net protection within an 
economy pursuing import-substituting industrialisation. 
However, for a brief period from 1980–84 it enjoyed 
considerably increased support levels that were quickly 
identified by economists and policy makers as unsustain-
able. A Labour government came to power in 1984 
following a snap general election and was quickly forced 
into devaluation of the New Zealand dollar by a financial 
crisis. Despite not having signalled this in its election 
campaign, it then embarked on a radical reform of the 
entire economy, focusing on achieving macroeconomic 
balance and stripping away sectoral policy support.
Agricultural support - the majority of which was to 
sheep meat, wool and beef production - was the first to 
be cut. In the first year, 1984–85, the effects of the cuts 
were offset by the benefits from exchange rate devalu-
ation combined with high international commodity 
prices. It took longer to control inflation than had been 
expected. In the meantime, high real interest rates caused 
the exchange rate to appreciate again and this, combined 
with two years of lower international commodity prices, 
made the adjustment for New Zealand’s farmers to their 
loss of policy support much more painful than would 
otherwise have been the case. Land prices fell when 
support was withdrawn, leaving some farmers severely 
indebted, whilst farmers in marginal areas found it hard 
to compete in the undistorted market. Some support to 
ease the adjustment process was forthcoming from the 
Labour government after it was returned to power in 
1987.
Government agencies in all sectors were subject to 
‘new public management’ aimed at increasing their effi-
ciency. Within the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
reform began in 1985, with initial targets set for cost 
recovery of services such as quality control and extension. 
Organisationally, services were separated from policy 
and ultimately the former were either privatised or spun 
off into independent agencies.
An interesting exception to radical reform was the 
preservation of export marketing organisations. Instead 
of introducing competition, efforts were made to increase 
their efficiency and accountability to producers.
Inflation was eventually brought under control in 1989 
and both the economy as a whole and the agricultural 
sector in particular resumed growth in the early 1990s. 
There was some switching out of sheep meat and wool 
towards, in particular, dairy and horticulture. Overall, 
farmers managed to raise total factor productivity, so as 
to maintain overall output levels with reduced inputs, 
thereby fairly quickly restoring profit levels after an initial 
shock.
New Zealand’s reforms were not opposed by the main 
farmers’ organisation. This broadly supported reform and 
indeed, pressed the government to reform other sectors 
such as ports and transport where inefficiencies impaired 
the competitiveness of export agriculture.
Conclusions
The context of agricultural reform was that of response 
to a perceived crisis, either economic, political or a combi-
nation of both. In all cases, with the part exception of 
China, reforms were undertaken following a change of 
government. The crisis seen was not specifically agricul-
tural, nor even rural: in all four cases, it was a national 
problem. It was not surprising then to see that agricultural 
reform was part of a wider set of measures designed to 
affect the entire economy. In all four cases studied here, 
the national programme included liberalisation of 
markets and a retreat of the state from intervening in 
the economy, although we do not mean to imply that 
this is the only form that reform can take.
The main difference within the four cases was the pace 
and sequencing of the reforms. Chile and New Zealand 
went for swift and comprehensive reforms - ‘big-bangs’, 
while the approach in Bangladesh and China was more 
gradual, with reforms introduced in stages.
When examining the agricultural content of the 
reforms, in many cases these were the sectoral concomi-
tants of a more general strategy, as seen for example in 
the liberalisation of markets for agricultural produce and 
inputs, in reducing subsidies, and in reducing the extent 
of state intervention in production and markets. In all 
cases, the reforms saw the scope of public agencies, and 
especially parastatals, reduced.
Process: the sense of crisis gave incoming govern-
ments a mandate to make substantial changes. In all 
cases, the new leaders of the countries had a vision of 
change and were prepared to bring this about. It helped 
that in three of the cases, the reforming governments 
were not subject to full democratic scrutiny: two military 
administrations in power after coups, and a single-party 
state. In New Zealand, where this condition did not apply, 
it seemed the elected government benefited from a 
widespread acknowledgment that change was 
needed.
Since both crisis and response were national, rather 
than specifically agricultural, the politics of agricultural 
reform were subsumed within national debates on 
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overall economic strategy. Indeed, in three of the cases, 
important reforms were seemingly imposed on agricul-
ture and the state agencies concerned with the sector 
by policy-makers and advisors situated in more powerful 
parts of the government, notably the ministry of 
finance.
None of the reforms necessarily went smoothly: all 
were marked by adjustments and indeed, some impor-
tant deviations from the initial schemes were seen. Given 
the more comprehensive nature of reforms in Chile and 
New Zealand than in China and Bangladesh, it is perhaps 
not surprising to find that there were also some ‘fits and 
starts’ in implementation in both these countries.
Outcomes: Success did not depend on the degree of 
reform. In Bangladesh and China, the modest initial 
measures taken paid off within a year or two. In both 
cases, food production for the domestic market increased 
well ahead of population growth: a valuable gain for 
countries that were very poor at the time and where the 
availability and price of food was a key issue. Initial 
success strengthened the hands of reformers and allowed 
bolder subsequent changes.
Success came quickly in Bangladesh and China since 
the changes were designed to stimulate farmers to 
increase production of crops and livestock that they knew 
well, for domestic markets that they knew equally well. 
Farmers had to make few adjustments. The main chal-
lenge in these cases was to encourage the emergence 
of private entrepreneurs in the supply chains: input 
dealers, credit intermediaries traders and processors.
In Chile and New Zealand, on the other hand, the 
response of farming to the changes was delayed, by a 
dozen years in the first case and by half that time in the 
latter. Two reasons relevant to both cases may explain 
the lag in response. First, some of the measures under-
taken to stabilise the macro-economy - higher interest 
rates, less public spending - had deflationary effects that 
affected farming as it did other sectors.
Second, many farms eventually changed their produc-
tion mix and techniques. In Chile the shift was from 
producing staple foods for the domestic market towards 
fruit, wine, nuts and other high-value crops for export. 
Exporting was clearly a challenge requiring learning 
about distant markets, achieving standards, and investing 
in the necessary equipment for processing and packing 
- a process that was assisted by the entry of foreign 
capital. In New Zealand farmers knew all about exporting, 
but they also shifted their production mix, away from 
sheep and beef cattle towards horticulture. New Zealand 
farmers also found that they could cut their costs of 
production to their advantage, costs savings outweighing 
any loss of production.
Lessons for Africa and other would-be 
reformers
Clearly, reform does not take place without political will. 
These cases support the hypothesis that significant 
changes only emerge from crises. But crisis is not the 
only requirement - if it were, Africa would lead the world 
in reforms. There has also to be a political response to 
crisis, usually a change of administration that has a 
mandate to act. This too is not sufficient: there has to be 
a reasonably coherent vision of strategic change amongst 
leaders and their policy advisers plus a sense that change 
is imperative.
External conditions usually matter as well: they can 
help or hinder reforms. Few countries can choose the 
moments when external conditions are suitable for 
reform: windows of opportunity for domestic policy 
reform may have to be seized irrespective of international 
market conditions. In most cases it is a question of 
designing measures in the light of external conditions 
- and hoping that they are advantageous.
Should reform packages be comprehensive and swift 
- the ‘big bang’, or gradual and phased? Big bang has the 
advantages of changing while there is the political will, 
often taking opponents by surprise and giving them little 
chance to obstruct change. If, however, producers are 
to respond quickly to new incentives and opportunities 
it does require functioning markets and indeed a set of 
economic institutions in place. It also requires capacity 
and competence within the public service. Both of these 
conditions existed within the developed New Zealand 
economy, whilst the large farm focus of policy in Chile 
reduced the market access and service delivery 
constraints. However, such conditions rarely exist in 
Africa.
Gradual approaches, on the other hand, run the risks 
of being waylaid, and may delay unnecessarily the adop-
tion of key reforms. But they have the advantages that 
they allow for some learning; they may be administra-
tively feasible when the civil service has limited capacity; 
and if initial measures are successful, they may whet the 
appetite of leaders and the public for further reforms.
The choice may be more apparent than real. Some 
reforms are relatively simple and swift to carry out, 
requiring little more than high level policy advice and a 
ministerial decision - think, for example, of altering a tariff, 
changing central bank interest rates, or even adjusting 
government budgets. Others inherently require more 
time and more staff: as applies when restructuring a 
ministry, privatising a state-owned enterprise, or redis-
tributing land. By and large, most measures for macro-
economic stabilisation belong to the first category; 
structural changes, institution building, and many other 
measures that enhance supply response belong to the 
second.
Not only so different aspects of reform vary, but their 
feasibility will also vary by context - depending on factors 
such as the capacity of the public service, the extent of 
development of markets, institutions and private enter-
prises, and the experience and abilities of farmers. Hence 
the feasibility, pace and sequencing of reform require 
considerable adaptation to circumstances. There may 
thus be less room to choose the pace and sequence of 
reform than may be imagined.
Since political choices do not have to be rational, and 
rarely are fully informed, it is perfectly possible to 
misjudge the feasible range, pace and sequence of 
reforms. Given such uncertainties, there is something to 
be said for a prior preference for gradual reform, since 
this avoids large mistakes and allows more time for 
learning and adjustment. It may be just coincidence, but 
the two countries that took a more gradual approach to 
reform took no longer to see through the various stages 
of policy changes and see the benefits, than it took the 
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two countries that opted for more rapid reforms to see 
the benefits of their changes.
Introduction
This report summarises the experience of four countries 
- Bangladesh, Chile, China and New Zealand - with 
episodes of agricultural policy reform.1 It is the first stage 
of work that will subsequently examine agricultural 
reform experiences within African countries, specifically 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Malawi.
The reform experiences covered in the report, 
purposely selected since they are often seen as being 
successful, are as follows:
Reform of agricultural input markets in Bangladesh in  •
the early 1980s, followed by liberalisation of grain 
trading and the cancellation of several longstanding 
programmes of public distribution of grains during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s;
The impact of economy-wide reforms and counter- •
reform of land on Chilean agriculture from 1973 
through to the 1980s;
Introduction of the ‘household responsibility system’  •
of production and liberalisation of marketing in China 
starting around 1978; and,
Removal of price and other support to New Zealand  •
farming that began in 1984 and continued into the 
1990s.
This review seeks to answer the following 
questions:
What were the conditions that created the impetus  •
for agricultural reform?
What factors determined the actual content of the  •
reform packages?
What challenges were faced in the implementation of  •
the reform and what lessons, if any, can be learnt from 
these for future reform programmes?
What opposition was there to the reforms and how  •
was this overcome?
What factors exerted the greatest influence on the  •
outcomes of the reform?
In the chapters that follow we present the four country 
case studies, based on reviews of secondary literature 
and some insights from key informants; followed by a 
chapter  summaris ing and synthesis ing the 
experiences.
Bangladesh
Introduction
Bangladesh became independent in 1971. During the 
1970s there was much state engagement in both provi-
sion of farm inputs and marketing of produce. Reforms 
began in the late 1970s and early 1980s when there was 
notable liberalisation of input markets. In the early 1990s 
marketing of produce, and above all food grains, was 
liberalised. At the same time trade policy was reformed 
to reduce protection against imports and to allow private 
companies to enter international trade.
Context of reform
At independence in 1971 Bangladesh was one of the 
world’s poorest countries. Densely settled, it was predom-
inantly rural. The land was also highly vulnerable to 
natural hazards, both cyclones from the Bay of Bengal 
and (exceptional) floods from the great rivers - the Ganga, 
Meghna and Brahmaputra - that flow through 
Bangladesh.2
While the country benefits from alluvial soils and 
annual flooding that allows wetland rice to be grown, 
average farm sizes were - and remain - small, in part owing 
to the heavy pressure of population in rural areas. The 
agricultural economy at independence was moreover 
growing only slowly: yields of rice, by far the main food 
crop, had risen by just 1.5% a year from 1950 to 1971 
(Hossain 1988).
In the early 1970s the situation of Bangladesh was 
parlous: extensive poverty, high vulnerability, and appar-
ently so few resources per person that the country 
seemed locked into poverty. The country was thus heavily 
dependent on food aid to feed its growing population.
The Bangladeshi economy at the time was marked by 
extensive state controls over markets and public owner-
ship of key enterprises. In the agriculture field, the 
Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation 
(BADC) was responsible for the import and wholesaling 
of all agricultural inputs, and administered price controls 
and licensing for their retail distribution.
The early years after independence were marked by 
calamity in the form of the 1974 famine, and the political 
upheavals of 1975 as one-party rule was brought in, the 
first president, Sheik Mujib, was assassinated and a series 
of military coups led to dictatorial rule. In apparent recog-
nition of the need for change of economic direction, Sheik 
Mujib’s last government took steps towards a an economy 
with state intervention and more reliance on markets, 
an approach that was continued and intensified under 
the government of General Ziaur Rahman in the second 
half of the 1970s. The gradual reforms that date from this 
period covered the key areas of agriculture, industry and 
trade and indeed, the economy as a whole. (World Bank 
2003)
The reforms undertaken in agriculture
Table 2.1 outlines the agricultural reforms undertaken 
from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s. Two waves of 
reforms took place. In the early to mid-1980s, subsidies 
on inputs were cut back, and domestic trading of inputs 
was liberalised.
A second wave of reforms came in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. This included the liberalisation of imports 
of inputs, but also saw private trading in grain markets 
both domestic and international, liberalised, and major 
reductions to longstanding programmes for public distri-
bution of grains.
Over the course of around fifteen years, wide-ranging 
reforms in agricultural policy were carried out. By the 
end of the process, the markets for both farm inputs and 
outputs had been almost completely liberalised from a 
previous situation of considerable and pervasive state 
interventions and controls. Subsidies and support to 
agriculture had also been cut, other than public invest-
ments in agricultural research and extension, flood 
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control, and other rural physical infrastructure. In the 
breadth and depth of agricultural reforms, Bangladesh 
stands alone amongst its South Asian neighbours, where 
reforms have been much more limited (Ahmed 1996).
As will be described, the reforms appear to have been 
very largely successful. Public transfers to farmers as 
farmers, and to food consumers, have been much 
reduced; while private markets in inputs and outputs 
have functioned reasonably well. The ultimate proof of 
the pudding is that since the reforms, Bangladesh has 
seen sustained increases in the production of rice, and 
a fall in the wholesale and retail prices for rice to some-
thing like half the levels prevailing in the early 1980s.
The process of reform
Two forces can be singled out as propelling reforms in 
the 1980s. One was pressure from the main aid donors, 
above all USAID and the World Bank, presumably inspired 
by the Washington Consensus. The other was domestic 
concern over the cost of subsidies and transfers, and an 
awareness of the ineffectiveness and inefficiencies of 
public interventions.
Table 2.1. The reforms undertaken in Bangladesh agriculture, early 1990s to mid 1990s
1980–1985 1986–1989 1990–1996
Other Inputs 1980 Pesticide 
subsidies eliminated, 
import and distribu-
tion liberalised 
passing from MinAg 
to private sector
1990 Seeds: new policy proposed
Fertiliser 1978–84 Fertiliser: 
BADC withdraws 
from retailing and 
thana wholesaling. 
Licensing abolished, 
movement restric-
tions removed 
(except for 8km 
border zone) Prices 
deregulated Subsidy 
reduced, from 50% of 
cost in FY1979 to 
21% by FY1982
1987 Fertiliser: private 
traders allowed to buy 
at factory gates and 
ports
1992: Fertiliser: free import from world 
market 1994–95: Fertiliser shortages see 
re-imposition of government controls on 
dealers, with licensing, quotas, and delimi-
tation of sales areas
Machinery 1980–85 Irrigation: 
low lift pumps and 
tubewells sold by 
BADC to private 
parties, backed by 
special credit
1987 Irrigation: private 
dealers allowed to 
import engines and 
pumps 1988 Irrigation: 
standardisation rules 
limiting makes and 
models of equipment 
removed 1989 Power 
tillers: import restric-
tions, standardisation 
rules lifted
1995 Power tillers, tractors: duty free 
import, with credit support to buyers
Marketing 1992 Rural rationing withdrawn, Statutory 
rationing abolished 1991–93: Reduced 
public procurement
Trade 1991–93 Liberalised grain trade Reduced 
tariffs on imports: Import-weighted average 
tariffs
FY 94 FY 96 FY 02
Primary commodity 27.2% 13.2% 9.4%
Intermediate inputs 22.9% 22.7% 16.2%
All commodities 24.1% 17.0% 9.7%
Overall 1988/89 to 1995/96
Input subsidy: down from 2.53% to 0.83% value of output
Price support down from 0.20% to 0.01% of output
PSE down from 2.73 to 0.84
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The success of the first wave of agricultural reforms 
in the 1980s, in both saving the government funds and 
encouraging the use of input, may have paved the way 
for the probably more controversial reforms of grain 
marketing in the late 1990s and early 1990s - where there 
were longstanding arrangements of public procurement 
of rice, storage, and distribution to particular groups at 
subsidised prices. Once again, key factors were the twin 
forces of donor advocacy and domestic concerns over 
costs. Foreign aid also fell during the 1990s, making it 
clear to government that domestic resources would be 
increasingly important. Closure of costly public 
programmes was thus seen as a good way to make 
economies.
By the late 1980s and early 1990s there was growing 
awareness of the costs of the public distribution and the 
extent of leakage away from target groups, thanks to 
reports from NGOs such as the Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Centre (BRAC) and the efforts of the IFPRI 
team located in the Ministry of Food (Babu 2000). The 
latter group in particular was able to quantify the losses, 
and thereby making the cost of waste dramatically clear. 
It was also well located within the Ministry to make sure 
that the messages reached ministers. One of the reports 
was leaked to the press and the publication of its main 
findings caused a stir in policy circles.
The reformers could count on the support of the main 
food aid donors - Canada, the European Commission, 
and the USA - and deflect criticism towards to these 
outsiders.
The context, however, favoured reformers. In the late 
1970s and early 1980s the prices of diesel and fertiliser 
were high internationally thanks to the surging oil prices 
of 1973 and 1979. But by the early 1980s the oil price 
was coming down. This meant that even as reformers 
cut the subsidy on fertiliser, the price fell on the domestic 
markets. Similarly, as irrigation equipment became more 
available, and cheaper, the price of diesel to keep the 
pumps operating was falling. Figure 2.1 shows these price 
movements.
Seen in terms of relative prices, the picture can be 
seen in Figure 2.2. At the time that input market reform 
was contemplated, the situation for rice farmers was poor, 
with the costs of outputs to inputs having fallen sharply 
from 1979 to 1980. After the key reforms in the input 
markets, the fall in the prices of inputs was so strong that 
even though the price of rice was falling, relative to input 
prices that of rice rose a little.
In part the reduced prices of inputs were a conse-
quence of reforms that allowed more efficiency in distri-
bution of inputs with reduced marketing margins. But 
in large part they came from movements in international 
prices. Reformers, then, were able to take advantage of 
fortuitous events in world markets.
Not all was luck, however. The cost of irrigation equip-
ment came tumbling down in the late 1980s, thanks to 
opening up imports and abandoning rules that only 
allowed the import certain standard models. This meant 
that the cost of pumps and tubewell equipment on the 
open market fell to well below the price that had previ-
ously been charged by the parastatal even with subsidy. 
The reformers had spotted that it was possible to make 
great savings on the cost of equipment by 
liberalisation.
Success bred success. The input market reforms can 
be credited with, in first instance, an acceleration in the 
use of fertiliser and tubewell irrigation. The latter was 
particularly important in allowing winter cultivation of 
irrigated rice (the boro crop). Previously the bulk of 
domestic rice production came from the aman crop, 
planted during the summer. Double cropping, use of 
modern varieties and increased fertiliser use led to major 
Figure 2.1: Prices of rice and inputs in Bangladesh in the late 1970s and 1980s
Source: Computed from data in Ahmed 1995
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increases in rice production. While technology accounted 
for some the gains, reforms encouraged its use. Ahmed 
(1995) calculates that by 1992 Bangladesh was producing 
between 20% and 32% more rice than it would have 
done had the reforms not taken place.
Success with the green revolution in the 1980s meant 
that by the early 1990s the country was increasingly less 
reliant on food aid, and indeed, the prices of rice in the 
open market were falling. The value of the subsidised 
rations was thus in decline, and there seems to have been 
only muted protest from the 15 million recipients when 
the two main ration schemes were closed down in the 
early 1990s.
Ahmed’s assessment of the input reforms stresses the 
phased approach adopted. Bangladesh did not liberalise 
at a stroke: instead, the markets were freed in stages. 
This made the task more manageable, and it also allowed 
reformers to see success before embarking on wider 
measures. They were also able to undertake the most 
obviously beneficial reforms first of all. For example, in 
the distribution of inputs, the heavy hand of the state 
monopoly was at its clumsiest at the retail level, where 
it tried to control prices and margins of licensed dealers. 
Thus the first step was to relinquish those controls on 
retailers. Only later did the reforms take on the wholesale 
and import-export functions of the BADC, where inef-
ficiencies were less.
The process of market liberalisation was monitored 
by the IFDC for the performance of markets with a view 
to resolving emerging problems promptly.
Finally, some of the reforms were brought in by 
incoming governments, with political programmes that 
favoured reforms - the events after the entry of the BNP 
government in 1991 is a good example.
What of the opposition to the reforms? Several sources 
of opposition are mentioned in the literature, thus:
Military and police: while most programmes of subsi- •
dised rations have been either closed down or targeted 
to the poor, those for the military and police remain. 
They are judged too powerful a group to alienate;
Rice mill owners who realised considerable rents from  •
the old form of public procurement from the mill gate. 
The reforms contemplate open tendering to replace 
mill-gate acquisitions. It is not clear that this change 
has been made, but in any case the level of public 
procurement has fallen; and,
Intellectuals: Ahmed (2005) mentions a 1990 paper  •
by two prominent academics who argued for subsidies 
on fertiliser, and feared that moving to liberal markets 
lead to more capitalist farming and make national self-
sufficiency in basic foods even less likely. Clearly this 
kind of objection did not prevail. Such doubts would 
have been rapidly allayed by the increased rice 
harvests.
While the reforms in Bangladesh is general can be 
seen as a series of phased and gradual measures, they 
were not without reversals. In 1994–95 the market for 
fertiliser failed and shortages became widespread, partly 
it seems on account of fertiliser produced in the country 
with a public subsidy being exported. The government 
in response reintroduced controls on dealers.
Outcomes of reform
The 1980s reforms were successful in at least two dimen-
sions. First, for government, there were clear savings from 
cutting subsidies on inputs. In FY 1981 the subsidies on 
fertiliser and irrigation water cost 15% of all tax 
revenues.
Second, input dealers and farmers responded: fertiliser 
use increased - see Figure 2.3, and the use of pumps and 
tubewells rose very strongly so that groundwater irriga-
tion rapidly outstripped the area under surface irrigation 
- see Figure 2.4. These combined effects allowed the 
green revolution varieties of rice to be adopted, and for 
land to be cropped more than once a year. This allowed 
rice production, see Figure 2.5, to expand during the 
1980s and 1990s well ahead of population growth so 
Figure 2.2. Relative prices of rice to fertiliser and diesel in Bangladesh in the late 1970s and 1980s
Source: Computed from data in Ahmed 1995
Working Paper 002 www.future-agricultures.org8
that by the early 2000s the country was close to domestic 
self-sufficiency.
The marketing reforms of the early 1990s had the 
principal virtue of saving public spending. For example, 
the rural rationing programme was costing US$31M a 
year when it was closed down.
Lessons from Bangladesh
Phase the reforms. Look to do the simpler things first  •
of all, demonstrate success, and then move towards 
more difficult tasks. Monitor markets when they are 
liberalised, and take action to correct emerging 
problems. 
Choose the moment to act. It helps to reform when  •
there are opportunities for clearly visible gains in the 
short term. It also helps when prices on international 
and national markets are moving to cushion hardships 
created by loss of subsidies, and that allow vigorous 
supply response to new incentives created.
Use formal research to reveal the costs of existing poli- •
cies. Get the numbers into the debate, with cabinet 
briefings, policy seminars and (leaked) press reports. 
Figure 2.3. Bangladesh fertiliser consumption, 1961 to 2002
Source: FAOSTAT data
Figure 2.4. Trends in irrigation cover and the area planted to modern varieties of rice in the boro season, 1969/70 
to 2001/02
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People may be aware that there are problems, but the 
numbers can shock sufficiently for people to act.
Donor pressure can be helpful, especially if they can 
become the targets for the reactions of those losing from 
reforms and thus deflect criticism from domestic 
reformers.
Chile
Introduction
This chapter analyses the reform processes which took 
place under General Pinochet’s authoritarian military 
regime (1973–89). These reforms covered a wide range 
of policy domains: land (counter) reform, privatisation 
of land and state enterprises, exchange rate devaluations, 
trade liberalisation (reduction or removal of tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions), financial sector liberalisation, 
labour market de-regulation, protection of property 
rights and infrastructure development. The reform 
package has been described as the most comprehensive 
and profound neo-liberal developmental model of the 
last three decades (Jarvis et al., 2004).
Although most of these economic policies were not 
generally directed to the agriculture sector,3 they had 
significant impact on Chilean agrarian structures and 
agricultural performance. The average size of holding 
was significantly reduced;4 the relation between land-
owners and farm labourers changed leading eventually 
to the emergence of a more independent, skilled and 
competitive labour force; agriculture production systems 
were modernized as the liberalisation of trade facilitated 
access to new foreign technologies; the agriculture 
product mix shifted from traditional grains and oilseeds 
production for the domestic market towards high value 
exports such as fruits, nuts and wine.
The direction and depth of reforms and their impact 
on agricultural structures and performance varied 
considerably during the sixteen-year military dictator-
ship. E. Silva (1993) distinguishes three phases of neo-
liberal restructuring: gradual (1973–75), radical (1975–82) 
and pragmatic (1983–89) - see Table 3.1. Improvements 
in agricultural performance became apparent only from 
1985, during the pragmatic stage, as the result of the 
combination of a stabilised macro-economy, some 
degree of protection to the agricultural sector and favour-
able conditions in the international market. Agriculture 
modernization and prosperity was, however, achieved 
at the cost of distributional inequalities and, in the first 
years of reform, increased rural poverty.
Context of reform
The context for the introduction of the reforms was a 
deep economic recession coupled with a vigorous social 
and political struggle which culminated with a military 
coup and the institution of a military dictatorship in 1973. 
The crises resulted from the collapse, in the late 1960s, 
of the import-substitution industrialization (ISI) model 
of economic development in a context of world-wide 
economic stagnation and strong polarisation of interests 
and political forces within Chilean society.
The ISI model5 had generated substantial transforma-
tions in the modes of production and political and social 
structures (Taylor, 2001). Key changes included: industry 
growing substantially in size while the agriculture sector 
declined; the emergence of an industrial bourgeoisie 
and expansion of urban middle class; migration of peas-
ants from rural areas into expanding urban centres; the 
growth of a politically organised working class with the 
Communist and Socialist parties expanding to constitute 
an important threat to the dominance of landowners 
and urban bourgeoisie; and, increased state intervention6 
combined with measures to attract foreign capital.
The collapse of the ISI model was prompted by world-
wide economic stagnation in the mid to late 1970s which 
had strong repercussions on Chilean exports of raw 
materials, particularly copper (80% of Chile’s export earn-
ings), which were the source of earning supporting the 
import of industrial inputs and technology. The decline 
in export earnings led to growing public indebtedness, 
increasing dependency on foreign capital, rising inflation 
and declining real wages, and strong pressures to reduce 
social spending and increase investment.
In this context of economic crisis, the conformation 
of social structures resulted in growing polarisation of 
Source: FAOSTAT data
Figure 2.5. Bangladesh: Rice paddy production, 1961 to 2003
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forces: a politically mobilized working class reacting 
against the decline of wages and reduction in social 
spending, and a wealthy capitalist class demanding 
increases in investments to hold back the deepening 
recession. The 1970 election reflected this polarisation 
and produced a left-wing government, led by Salvador 
Allende, with little more than half of the votes.
Allende’s socialist programme reinforced distribu-
tional mechanisms and nationalized key economic 
sectors. Crucially, it carried out a massive land reform 
which expropriated large land holdings and distributed 
it to peasant farmers.7 Allende’s response to the crisis 
proved however ineffective and counterproductive. The 
result was an even deeper economic crisis, continuous 
class struggles and strong pressure from domestic bour-
geoisie (particularly expropriated landowners) and 
foreign investors, which led to a counter-revolution 
through a military coup and the formation of an authori-
tarian state.
It was in this context of strong economic crisis and 
social and political turbulence that the new self-instituted 
administration launched a profound and wide-ranging 
policy reform package. The military regime allied to the 
bourgeoisie wanted to re-establish the conditions for 
capital accumulation and to eliminate the political forces 
(such as peasants and labour unions and opposition 
parties) that posed a threat to capitalism.
Policy formation
Proposed content of the reforms
The wide-ranging economic reforms carried out during 
the authoritarian regime were based around four main 
objectives: (i) stabilisation to correct macroeconomic 
imbalances; (ii) market liberalisation and deregulation 
with the opening the economy to international markets; 
(iii) specialization in export-oriented production in areas 
where Chile had a comparative advantage, and (iv) ‘state 
subsidiarity’8, i.e. the withdrawal of the state from 
economic activity through large scale privatisation and 
substantial reduction in social spending.
Macroeconomic stabilisation was about managing the 
interest and exchange rates and cutting down the fiscal 
deficit. Exchange rate management was, according to 
Valdés (1994), central to the reform package given its 
importance in determining the incentives facing the 
tradable sector.
Market liberalisation measures included the freeing 
of prices, deregulation of trade, withdrawal of restrictions 
to free mobility of capital and the removal of basic 
consumer goods subsidies. In addition to this, industries, 
land, banks (nationalized or redistributed in previous 
administration) and public services (such as agricultural 
extension) were privatised.
The counter-reform to land distribution was part of 
the process of privatisation. About 28% of the land expro-
priated during Frei and Allende’s regimes was returned 
Table 4: Proportion of rural households severely 
affected by different shocks and stresses, 2005 
to 2007
Table 3.1. Stages of economic reform during Chile’s authoritarian neo-liberalism, 1973-1989
Stage Gradual neo-liber-
alism (1973–75)
Radical neo-liberalism (1975–82) Pragmatic neo-liberalism 
(1983–89)
Context Political and social 
instability 
Economic crisis
Slow growth 
High inflation 
Deepening authoritarianism through 
strong political repression
Severe recession in 1982-83 driven 
by financial sector collapse
Economic 
policy 
measures
Gradual reduction 
of tariffs from an 
average of 94% to 
60% in 3 years 
Devaluation of 
the exchange rate 
Progressive 
privatisation
Drastic deflation 
Acceleration of tariffs reductions 
Rapid privatisation
Lower tariffs but protection 
against unfair competition 
High real exchange rates and low 
interest rates 
Moderate re-regulation of capital 
flows 
Further privileges to export sector 
Renewed privatisation 
Sectoral policies (export promo-
tion, construction projects, 
agricultural development) 
State playing a more active role in 
agricultural development: new 
series of tariffs introduced and 
price guarantees reintroduced
Driving 
forces
Authoritarian 
regime
Neo-liberal technocrats occupying 
senior government positions 
Large internationally oriented 
economic conglomerates (liquid 
assets holders)
Business and landowning associa-
tions pragmatic formed coalition 
calling for greater protection
Opposition Repressed Peasants and working class repressed 
Landowners and business entrepre-
neurs penalised remained loyal to the 
military regime although discontent 
starting to mount
Sources: E. Silva (1993), P. Silva (1993), Valdés (1994) and Kurtz (1999).
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to their former owners, 10% was retained by the state 
and 5% auctioned (Jarvis et al., 2004). The remaining 57% 
was subdivided into plots of land (parcelas) and distrib-
uted to selected beneficiaries.9 About 45% of the peas-
ants who had gained land in the previous agrarian 
reforms lost their property rights (Taylor, 2001). Many of 
the former landowners who received their property back, 
and many of those who received a parcela, eventually 
sold it to emerging large agro-export enterprises, driven 
by the increased value of land (particularly that suitable 
for fruit production) and by the lack of supportive policies 
towards the beneficiaries, who lacked capital and tech-
nical skills (Jarvis et al., 2004).
Other agriculture sector related measures included: 
the transfer of state agri-businesses and public institu-
tions (crucially, agricultural extension) to the private 
sector,10 the sale of the entire machinery park provided 
to the Sector Reformado11 by the state, the elimination 
of fixed prices and price guarantees paid to producers 
by the state, the elimination of state monopoly on agri-
cultural inputs, the reduction and subsequently elimina-
tion of tariffs and taxes on the import of foodstuffs and 
agricultural inputs, the elimination of subsidised credit 
to peasant farmers, and substantial contraction of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and public spending.
Yet, despite the austerity of the reform package there 
were also protected niches. The forestry sector was the 
striking exception to the state subsidiarity policy, with 
private investors in the sector benefiting from generous 
state subsidies and tax exemptions (Silva, 1990).
Proponents and arguments
The policy reforms were initially enthusiastically endorsed 
by the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, particularly the land-
owners traumatized by Frei and Allende’s expropriations. 
As P. Silva (1993) notes: 
‘the overthrow of Allende produced a general sense 
of joy among entrepreneurial circles. Even the offi-
cial announcement of the application of a tough 
economic policy, severe credit restrictions, and the 
elimination of state support for the productive 
sectors, initially constituted no major deterrent to 
continued support for the new authorities’ (p. 
66). 
Hence, despite the severity of reforms in the agricul-
ture sector, they were initially supported by landowners 
who were willing to accept the sacrifices demanded by 
neo-liberalism in gratitude for the recovery of their land 
and the dismantling of the peasant movement.
While strongly driven by the interests of the military 
apparatus and the capitalistic bourgeoisie, in particularly 
the emerging internationally-orientated conglomerates,12 
the reforms were conducted under the technocratic 
guidance of the so-called ‘Chicago Boys’- a group of 
Chilean economists trained at the University of Chicago 
and strongly influenced by Milton Friedman’s monetarist 
paradigm.13
The reform engineers attributed the economic crisis 
to rising wages and the expansion of state expenditure 
to unsustainable levels which reinforced market distor-
tions and undermined the profitability of capitalist enter-
prise. In response to this crisis narrative, a comprehensive 
package of neo-liberal policy measures was enforced by 
the authoritarian regime.
Although many have praised the internal coherence, 
comprehensive and determination of the reform experi-
ence, others have argued that the reform process was 
marked by hesitation, contradictions, shifting goals and 
incremental choices which resulted from the attempts 
by the military to address two often conflicting over-
arching goals - economic stabilization and political 
restructuring (Kurtz, 1999). Indeed, as discussed further 
below, the reform process seems to have been shaped 
by the dynamic interaction between the political agenda 
of the authoritarian state, the intellectual positioning of 
technocrats and the diverging economic interests of the 
traditional producers focused on domestic markets and 
the internationally-oriented entrepreneurs.
Debates on reforms
There was little contestation to the reforms during 
the first years of implementation. The authoritarian 
regime allowed the neo-liberal model to be applied 
which would have been harder or impossible under 
democratic rule. As Silva (1990) points out ‘within a demo-
cratic framework the political and social tensions gener-
ated by the introduction of this policy would have 
immediately engendered massive rejection from the 
popular parties and social organisation, making its 
further application impossible’ (p. 31).
Resistance and opposition to the policy measures - 
which penalized directly peasant farmers and the urban 
working class - were prevented through strong repres-
sion of opposition parties and organised societal forces. 
Labour unions and farmer associations were dissolved, 
strikes prohibited, political opposition suppressed and 
oppressive labour legislation enacted.
Furthermore, the doctrine of state subsidiarity and 
state contraction was convenient to the new military 
administration which used it to get supporters of the 
previous regime out of government posts. Silva (1990) 
argues that personnel cuts were carried out at the 
Ministry of Agriculture for strictly political reasons.
Opposition from the other greatly disadvantaged 
group - landowners producing traditional crops to 
domestic markets and negatively affected by market 
liberalisation and fierce foreign competition - was tempo-
rarily restrained by the sense of loyalty and gratitude to 
the military regime. There were, however, some cleavages 
and tensions within landowner organisations well docu-
mented by P. Silva (1993).14 But the protests never 
acquired a political connotation and criticisms were 
always directed to the ‘Chicago Boys’ technocracy and 
not the military regime. Yet, some degree of contestation 
started progressively building up, leading eventually to 
a change in policy direction.
Policy implementation
Administratively and agencies
The implementation of reforms was conducted from the 
centre: the regime was supported by a highly centralised 
technocratic apparatus. The ‘Chicago Boys’ were indeed 
all macro-economists heading or advising ministries of 
economy, finance and the Central Bank. The degree of 
centralisation of policy implementation was also reflected 
by the contraction of the public sector bureaucratic 
Table 4: Proportion of rural households severely 
affected by different shocks and stresses, 2005 
to 2007
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structures. The Ministry of Agriculture, for example, was 
downsized to a fifth in seven years (Silva, 1990).
Indeed, for its very own nature the neo-liberal package 
was about central-level management of interest and 
exchange rates, and reformulation of the regulatory 
framework of commodity, financial and labour markets. 
On the whole, policies were about simplifying and 
reducing public sector intervention in the economy. 
Gwynne and Kay (1997) argue that with the exception 
of land counter-reform, during the 1970s the military 
government had no specific agrarian policy. Agrarian 
policy was what resulted from the economic policies 
defined centrally by finance and economy ministries. 
Only after 1982 a distinctive agrarian policy started to 
emerge (see below).
The technocratic apparatus driving reform implemen-
tation was also re-known for being inflexible and non-
consultative: ‘We have never consulted the agrarian 
producers for the adoption of any measure. Our decisions 
are not negotiated, and the government will not allow 
any pressure during the implementation of policies’ (P. 
Silva, 1993: 69, citing the Minister of Economy Pablo 
Baraona).
Obstacles, responses and revisions
The implementation of the neo-liberal model was 
anything but smooth and determined. Despite the often-
praised determination of the reform champions, there 
are strong arguments suggesting that neo-liberal reforms 
emerged from the opportunistic interplay between 
political and business agendas and that the neo-liberal 
technocracy was to some extent instrumental to the 
pursuit of those agendas.
Kurtz (1999) offers an additional perspective by 
arguing that the policy process rather characterized by 
hesitation, incrementalism, policy contradictions and 
shifting priorities in the attempt by the regime to address 
the two often conflicting overarching goals of economic 
stabilisation and political restructuring - what he calls, 
u s i n g  C h a r l e s  L i n d b l o m  t e r m ,  ‘d i s j o i n t e d 
incrementalism.’15
Pinochet’s regime opted initially for a moderate neo-
liberal strategy to avoid harming important pro-coup 
supporters, in particular those who would have been 
penalised by drastic trade liberalisation and exposure to 
foreign competition. Liberalisation of trade was hence 
moderate - tariff reductions were gradual and devalua-
tions of the exchange rate offered additional protection. 
Eduardo Silva (1993) argues that a ‘gradualist coalition’ 
- composed by internationally competitive producers 
for domestic markets, and those who had traditionally 
opposed high tariffs under ISI16 - had a strong influence 
in shaping the technocratic policy design.
The regime also found also ways to compensate for 
potential losses. Privatisation of state enterprises, for 
example, saw them sold off at well below market value 
and represented a significant state subsidy to the 
emerging economic groups which facilitated concentra-
tion of production in the hands of few conglomerates 
- a handful of major economic groups grew to control 
about 68% of transactions on the Chilean stockmarket 
(Taylor, 2001).
Economic liberalisation, privatisations and fiscal 
austerity intensified from 1975 till 1982. Several factors 
seem to have led to intensified reform (E. Silva, 1993 and 
Kurtz, 1999): (i) the ineffectiveness of the moderate 
approach to stabilisation - economic growth was stag-
nant and inflation still very high; (ii) mounting pressure 
from the international conglomerates for accelerated 
market liberalisation;17 and (iii) the establishment of 
political repression which had lowered the costs of deep-
ening the neo-liberal reforms.
The intensification of the neo-liberal model is also 
argued to have been motivated by the international pres-
sures for political opening. Kurtz (1999) argues that 
political stabilisation became the central goal driving 
reform from 1979-82, with market-led transformations 
seen as the means to prevent the emergence of statist 
or leftist policy proposals. The radicalisation of the neo-
liberal package was hence also instrumental to the 
political agenda of the authoritarian regime.
The radical neo-liberal package included drastic defla-
tionary measures, accelerated tariff reductions and rapid 
privatisation. This was the period in which the ‘Chicago 
Boys’ had the most influence in the design of economic 
policies, occupying powerful government positions and 
having very close connections with the large conglomer-
ates (E. Silva, 1993).
An exogenous economic shock in 1982, however, led 
to a significant reversal in the reform path, from radical 
to a more pragmatic form of neo-liberalism. The inter-
national debt crisis had significant impact in an economy 
highly exposed and dependent on foreign savings. The 
Chilean financial system collapsed and with it the empires 
of the large economic conglomerates. The whole 
economy plunged with production falling by 16.7% and 
unemployment reaching 26% (Taylor, 2001). The unpro-
tected agriculture sector was severely hit by the crisis: 
agricultural GDP dropped by 2.1% in 1982 and 3.6% in 
1983 and the total cultivated area decreased to 860,000 
hectares from a historical average of 1,200,000 hectares 
(P. Silva, 1993).
The nature of the shock led to a shift in the coalitional 
forces influencing policy reform. Landowners and busi-
nessmen with international market interests dominated 
the new coalition (E. Silva, 1993). They put substantial 
pressure on the government to reverse its policies – 
particularly in response to the bankruptcy of influential 
enterprises in the sugar and fruit export industry.18
In the face of the severe recession and mounting 
opposition, the neo-liberal economic model eventually 
collapsed and Pinochet discharged the neo-liberal 
economic team. From 1985 to 1989, Chile underwent a 
more pragmatic neo-liberal policy stage during which 
the state revisited the subsidiarity policy and started 
playing a much more interventionist role in managing 
the economy. In the agriculture sector, import tariffs,19 
credit facilities and price guarantees were re-introduced, 
the debts of agrarian entrepreneurs with banks were 
renegotiated and tough anti-dumping measures were 
adopted (P. Silva, 1990, 1993).
The economy and the agriculture sector in particular 
recovered considerably after 1983 as a result of the new 
policies but also from an improved situation in interna-
tional markets. The devaluations of the peso in 1982–83 
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had import-substituting effects and the agricultural trade 
deficit was eventually eliminated. Yet, the reformulation 
of agricultural policies favoured mostly the large land-
owners, with no social dimensions attempting to address 
the constraints facing the rural peasantry. In fact, the 
influential landowners were so satisfied with the new 
measures that they demobilized the landowner organiza-
tions (ibid).
Policy outcomes
Chile’s policy reforms had overall positive effects in agri-
culture over time, but in the short run these effects were 
not always as anticipated. Policy reforms were indeed 
marked by errors and setbacks. Valdés (1994) argues that 
the sequence and magnitude of reforms were incorrect 
and that the combination of rapid reduction in public 
spending, high real interest rates, elimination of credit 
and input subsidies and decline in the real exchange rate 
during 1978–82 harmed the agriculture sector 
severely.
Agricultural performance took off in 1985, as the result 
of a more moderate liberalisation policy, combined with 
changes in agrarian structures and favourable interna-
tional market conditions. Yet, although agriculture was 
significantly modernized and eventually achieved good 
performance in production, productivity and competi-
tiveness in international markets, this was accomplished 
at the cost of strong distributional inequalities and 
increased rural poverty.
Agricultural prices: reforms altered significantly the 
relative prices of agricultural products, reducing the price 
of the products for domestic consumption (such as 
oilseeds and grains), which benefited from high levels 
of protection prior to liberalisation, relative to the prices 
on export-oriented crops, such as fruits, wine, nuts and 
forestry products. International prices of Chile’s tradi-
tional crops also declined while that of its exports rose. 
These price changes led to significant adjustments in 
Chile’s crop mix.
Agricultural land prices: land prices grew steadily 
throughout the reform period and by 1984 land prices 
were four times higher than in 1970. Land became a very 
profitable investment, particularly in areas suitable for 
fruit production.
Technical change and productivity: use of agricultural 
inputs increased (Figure 3.1), improved access to foreign 
technology (new animal and seeds varieties, irrigation 
systems and machinery) benefited particularly the fruit 
sector; cultivation of basic foodstuffs was modernised 
and investments in plantations and agri-businesses were 
supported by large inflows of foreign capital (particularly 
to the fruit and forestry sectors). Input suppliers, machine 
shops, banks, and labour contractors proliferated in rural 
areas and agriculture became a technologically leading 
sector (Jarvis et al., 2004).
Agricultural growth: Initially after the reforms agricul-
ture stagnated, recovered a little after 1974, but it was 
to be until the early 1980s before growth accelerated- see 
Figure 3.2. Agricultural value added took off in 1984, 
growing more than 7% a year from 1984 to 1991 (Jarvis 
et al., 2004).20 Between the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s 
the sector as a whole saw production rise by 5% or more 
in almost all years. Fruit and forestry grew more rapidly 
(Figure 3.3), again seeing acceleration from the early 
1980s.
Agricultural balance of trade: remarkable changes in 
the structure of trade saw less dependence on copper 
exports in favour of exports of non-traditional agricultural 
products. Dramatic increases in exports in a few years, 
with the main source of growth being the fruit and 
forestry industry. Earning from agricultural exports rose 
by 158% from 1981 to 1988, with those from fruit rising 
Source: Jarvis et al. (2004).
Figure 3.1. Chile, Fertiliser consumption 1965 to 2000, tonnes
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by 163% (Chakravarty, 1993). Food imports did not rise 
in the same period, so the balance of agricultural trade 
became positive.
Agricultural labour, employment and wages: the 
agricultural labour force increased owing to population 
growth and reduced rural to urban migration; employ-
ment declined from 1975 to 1981 due to slow growth, 
decline of traditional crop prices and adjustments in land 
structures. Employment expanded thereafter, particu-
larly in the fruit sub-sector. The labour force composition 
saw a growing proportion of skilled temporary workers, 
mainly in fruit production with a rising proportion of 
female temporary workers. Agricultural wages fell 
dramatically after 1974 only to recover gradually after 
1979. Remuneration also changed with the old system 
that provided tenants with usufruct rights to land and 
in-kind payments being replaced by workers hired on a 
salary basis (a daily wage or, increasingly, for many tasks, 
on a contract or piece rate basis). With pay tied more 
closely to productivity, workers had stronger incentives 
to acquire skills and provide greater effort. Jarvis et al. 
(2004) note that productivity rose more quickly than 
workers’ earnings. 
Income distribution and rural poverty: the pattern 
of growth was very heterogeneous, favouring large 
conglomerates and those with best access to capital and 
Source: FAOSTAT data.
Figure 3.2. Chile. Agricultural output indices, 1968 to 2005
Source: Jarvis et al. (2004).
Figure 3.3: Chile. Total fruits production, 1965 to 1999: area harvested (Ha) and Tonnes
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technology (Cruz, 1993). Growth was particularly signifi-
cant in non-traditional exports.21 Poverty increased 
particularly in rural areas, to reach 50% in some areas. 
The rural poor suffered the most from the neo-liberal 
model because of the withdrawal of the state from the 
traditionally supportive role (as provider of technical 
assistance, cheap loans, etc.) and because more than half 
of the peasants who had secured land from expropriated 
farms after the land reform and counter-reforms had to 
sell their plots under unfavourable terms since they had 
received little support to make their farming activity 
profitable.22 Landless wage labourers were also badly hit 
because employment became overwhelmingly tempo-
rary, minimum wages suffer sharp fluctuations and there 
were severe restrictions to trade unions’ activities (ibid). 
There is evidence, however, that rural poverty eventually 
started to decline in the late 1980s and throughout the 
1990s, although this was still accompanied by a widening 
urban-rural gap (Foster and Valdés, 2004). The high 
demand for unskilled labour from the booming agricul-
tural sector coupled with the decline in real food prices 
reduction contributed to the reduction of rural poverty 
from 63.5% in 1987 to 37.3% in 1998 (ibid).
Lessons from Chile
Key issues from the Chilean experience with authoritarian 
neo-liberalism include the factors triggering reforms, 
determining choices of reforms, and those shaping prog-
ress through the selected path.
Reform initiation or re-orientation in Chile seems to 
have been strongly motivated by the occurrence of 
economic crises and the political breaches produced by 
those crises. Given the importance of the tradable sector 
in the economy, the developments in international 
market – both in commodity and financial markets – 
played a significant part in the generation of the crises. 
Chile also benefited strongly from the counter-season-
ality and low-storibility of a significant proportion of the 
country’s agricultural exports which has enable it to take 
advantage of lower trade barriers in northern markets 
(Foster and Valdés, 2004).
The definition of the actual content of reforms resulted 
from a combination of the need for both economic and 
political stabilisation. Although the neo-liberal techno-
cratic ideology played an important role (particularly 
until 1982), the reform paths chosen were significantly 
determined by the interests of the dominant social coali-
tions which were a critical source of support to the 
regime’s political agenda.
The authoritarian nature of the state was instrumental 
to its capacity to carry out the reforms and repress any 
obstacles on the way. But the authoritarian character of 
the state did not mean that the state was autonomous 
from societal pressures. It was rather built on the support 
of powerful societal coalitions who backed it up as a 
means to ensure the pursuit of their economic 
interests.
Despite the price paid in the short run in terms of rural 
poverty and inequality, the economic growth and agri-
cultural modernisation strategies eventually generated 
improvements in the living conditions of the rural poor, 
particularly throughout the 1990s. Can these improve-
ments be attributed back to Pinochet’s policy reforms, 
and were the social costs endured a necessary evil? Or 
where the positive poverty outcomes rather an unin-
tended fortunate result of policies which were not funda-
mentally driven by concerns for the poor? This is an 
ongoing debate.
China
Background to agricultural and rural 
reforms in China
China initiated agricultural and rural economic reforms 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although it was not 
well stated in many documents, the key driving force for 
reform ideas was the change in the Central leadership. 
Of course, the increased demand for better life and higher 
production efficiency in rural areas also were among 
significant factors.
The overall performance of China’s agricultural sector 
since the founding of the People’s Republic of China has 
been remarkable given the political instability (Great 
Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution, etc.) and inefficient 
economic management (of the Commune System) of 
the pre-reform period. Although it was successful in terms 
of eliminating a good deal of rural poverty and achieving 
greater equality among the rural population - features 
admired by many western development economists at 
the time, the Chinese were not satisfied with their own 
agricultural performance, in terms of productivity and 
growth.
Common deficiencies during pre-reform period 
included: low economic efficiency due to a uniform plan-
ning system that disregarded comparative advantages; 
and, over-emphasis on the agricultural policy of ‘taking 
grain as the key link’ rather than overall development 
mainly for food security purposes. At the same time, 
obstacles placed in the way of labour migration from 
rural to urban areas left a huge labour surplus in rural 
areas since more than 80% of the population were in 
rural areas.
As a result, agricultural production and productivity 
grew only slowly. However, the pressure of increasing 
demand for food due to population growth and the low 
living standards of much of the rural population forced 
the Government to re-examine its rural economic poli-
cies, especially after the death of Mao Zedong. The key 
factor was the change in the central leadership in the 
late 1970s, and the introduction of a reform programme 
under the overall direction of Deng Xiaoping.
Basic features of agricultural and rural 
reforms
The process of agricultural and rural reform was gradual 
and evolved over time. All the reform measures had been 
gradually introduced one by one on a regional trial basis 
and later these practices were spread throughout the 
country. Although it is difficult to discuss agricultural 
and rural economic reform separately from other reforms, 
the major features could be summarized as follows.
Reform of the system of production management,  •
circulation of commodities and finance mainly by 
allowing farmers to engage in production activities 
other than grain and oil-bearing products and by 
increasing agricultural output prices to increase 
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farmers incomes and improve the standard of 
living.23
The price and market reforms initiated in the late 
1970s were aimed at raising farm level procurement 
prices and gradually liberalizing the market. These 
reforms included gradual increases in the agricul-
tural procurement prices toward market prices, 
reductions in procurement quota levels, the intro-
duction of above quota bonuses for cotton, tobacco, 
and other cash crops, negotiated procurement of 
surplus production of rice, wheat, maize, soybean, 
edible oils, livestock, and most other commodities 
at price levels higher than those for quota procure-
ment, and flexibility in marketing of surplus produc-
tion of all categories of agricultural products by 
private traders. (Rozelle et al. 2005, 4)
Structural reform: before 1978 most farm production  •
was carried out by teams organised by the communes. 
The Household Responsibility System was introduced 
with the aim of introducing new production incentives 
for farmers, by which the teasms leased the land, draft 
animals and divisible tools to individual households. 
This idea was initially tried in one of the very poor 
counties in Southern China: its success soon was 
discovered by the Central leadership and it was subse-
quently recommended and adopted by most rural 
areas. By 1984 further reforms were introduced 
extending the leases to 15 years, allowing households 
to sub-let land parcels, and to hire labour.
Encouragement of rural industries - diversified  •
economy and township enterprises - by providing 
them with access to raw materials and product markets, 
which were relatively competitive. Tax for non-state 
enterprises were lowered to 35% compared to 55% in 
the state sector, on the grounds that the former had 
to acquire inputs in the market (Bromley & Yao 
2006).
Reform of rural technical and extension systems by  •
shifting the emphasis from concentrating on increase 
in grain yield alone to the transformation of agricultural 
technology - promoting agriculture by science and 
education - into a much broader field as applications 
to other crops were to be looked at, and economic as 
well as technical considerations were taken into 
account.
Reform of the rural political system, chiefly the aboli- •
tion of the commune system. The fundamental inten-
tion was to separate production management from 
the rural administrative or political system.
In essence, the reforms turned the Chinese rural 
economy into a half-planned and half market-oriented 
system. There were similarities, indeed, with the policies 
of the early-mid sixties, following the debacle of the Great 
Leap Forward. Farmers regained freedom in decision-
making and government control over rural areas weak-
ened. The general trend of reform has continued in this 
direction, towards marketisation and de-regulation.
The process of reform implementation
Initial reforms brought significant increases in agricultural 
production as well as noticeable improvement in rural 
peoples’ livelihoods. However, in viewing the past, 
although the reforms had gained national support, the 
process of agricultural and rural economic reform was 
far from smooth. The unexpected successes of the initial 
reform encouraged both Government and farmers to 
push forward with reforms. Bearing in mind the fact that 
there were no precedents to follow, beyond the limited 
experiments of the 1960s liberalization, even the 
reformers themselves were not sure what should be done 
next. Conflicts between political and economic objec-
tives contributed to the uncertainty and inconsistency 
in the party line and the direction and speed of reform.
As the reform process gathered pace, new successes 
and new problems were both encountered. One enduring 
tension has been the desire to relax administrative inter-
ventions to improve the market environment and the 
legitimate fear of social instability due to widening 
income inequality and differentials. This has caused oscil-
lations between tighter and looser control over the whole 
reform process. This situation is reflected especially in 
grain production while the Central leadership still put 
food security as top policy priorities.
One notable stage in the early reform process was the 
loosening of grain production control after the bountiful 
harvest in 1984 and re-tightening control in late 1980s 
and early 1990s due to the larger price rises for non-grain 
commodities and a shift in resources generally from 
agriculture to rural enterprises resulted in a sharp decline 
in agricultural outputs, especially grain output for a few 
years following 1984.
Apart from the above, there was one important aspect 
which needed to be addressed in order to understand 
the outcome of the reform: that is the attitudes of the 
participants. It was obvious that an effective policy not 
only depends on how ‘good’ the policy sounds, but also 
on how it is implemented and how people respond to 
it. The impetus for rural reform in China initially came 
from the grass-roots. Due to poor economic performance 
and the low standard of living in some backward areas, 
local cadres reintroduced incentive measures, such as 
contracting certain types of farm work to individuals. 
These began to a limited extent during the 1960s under 
the leadership of Liu Saho-qi ( the President of China at 
the time), and although they were afterwards officially 
abolished, they continued quietly in some areas. Only 
when the success of such activities came to be noticed 
by top-level officials, and the Central government 
approved, were such systems taken up in other parts of 
the country. After the long and stultifying period of 
collective management, the new system received great 
attention and evoked an immediate response from rural 
people. Increased prices accelerated the trend to decol-
lectivisation and the spread of individual household 
farming.
However, the very speed of events and pressure for 
more increments of reform - in marketing, credit and 
investment in rural infrastructure - led to a more cautious 
approach and the realization that the government 
needed to maintain control over the process of rural 
economic development. The decision to shift back to 
tighter controls on agricultural production was made 
under these conditions. From the mid-to-late 1980s 
onwards, Chinese leaders have been more ready to inter-
vene and to steer the course of reform to secure internal 
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order and a certain level of macro-economic stabilization 
in the face of inflationary pressures building up within 
the economy. The above cycle repeated again just a 
couple of years ago even after China joined the WTO.
Coupled with the agricultural and rural economic 
reforms, there has been overall parallel emphasis on 
political reform at community level: village leader elec-
tions and the implementation of ‘Organic Law’ of the 
outcome of such moves.
Outcomes of reforms
There is a large literature discussing both positive and 
negative outcomes of the agricultural and rural reform. 
Here, as the key points are drawn out (see Zhang, Huang 
& Rozelle, 2004 for details).
Overall rise in agricultural productivity - One of the 
main components of a healthy development process is 
that the agricultural sector has to have strong produc-
tivity growth (Johnston and Mellor, 1961). Figure 4.1 
shows the pattern of increasing production in Chinese 
agriculture. As can be seen, production compared to 
population increased notably in the 1980s and 1990s: 
the index of overall production per capita more than 
doubling in the twenty years after reforms.
Although there was concern in the early 1990s about 
the slow down of total factor productivity (TFP) in the 
late 1980s after the rapid rise in the early 1980s (Wen, 
1993), during the 1990s, productivity of rice, wheat, and 
maize, China’s main staple crops, have risen strongly (Jin 
et al., 2002). Between 1979 and 1996, average TFP for all 
crops rose at more than 3% a year. The rise has exceeded 
2% annually during the 1990s, far above the rate of 
growth of China’s population, and a rate of growth that 
is considered healthy by international standards.
Perhaps more importantly, China’s agricultural sector 
is poised to continue to grow. Although some of the 
growth in the early 1980s came from reform measures 
(which are one-time only changes), throughout the last 
20 years, China’s production growth, yield rises, and TFP 
increases have relied on the government’s investment 
into research and development and other infrastructure 
investments (Jin et al., 2002; Fan et al., 2001). More than 
60% of China’s TFP rise and almost all of the growth in 
rice yields came from new technologies (Hu et al., 2001; 
Huang and Rozelle, 1996). Investments in irrigation raised 
cropping incomes of the poor by up to 50% in North 
China’s maize and wheat areas (Huang et al., 2002b). 
China’s future commitment to increasing spending in 
conventional, biotechnology and water control means 
that the productivity of agriculture should continue to 
rise as long as the past performance continues (Huang, 
2001).
Significant increase in rural-urban migration - 
Development, however, is more than making the farming 
sector more productive. The shift of population from rural 
to urban and agriculture to industry is at the heart of the 
development process. Taylor and Martin (1999) have 
shown that, given China’s income level in the 1980s, 
urbanisation is lagging. However, in recent years, the 
Source: FAOSTAT
Figure 4.1. China. Production per capita in agriculture, 1978 to 2005
Table 4.1. Comparison of Labour Participation 
Rates in Percentage of Individuals that 
Participate in the Off-farm Labour Force by Age 
Categories, 2000 and 1990
Percentage with Off-farm Work in:
Age Ranges 1990 2000
16-20 (a) 23.7 75.8
21-25 33.6 67.2
26-30 28.8 52.5
31-35 26.9 47.6
36-40 20.5 43.3
41-50 20.8 37.6
Source: Authors’ survey as reported in de Brauw, 2002.
(a) Table compares workers aged 16 and 20 in 1990 with 
workers aged 16 to 20 in 2000.
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status quo has changed faster in the off farm sector than 
in any other. The breakdown of barriers in both rural and 
urban areas in the mid-1990s started an unprecedented, 
and perhaps irreversible, flow of labor to the cities 
(Rozelle et al., 1999). According to a new study by de 
Brauw et al. (2002), despite the macroeconomic condi-
tions of the late 1990s, the surge in off-farm employment 
not only continued after 1995, it accelerated. Today, more 
than 200 million people work off the farm and more than 
half have jobs in the city. Almost 85% of rural households 
have at least one member in the off farm sector.
More poignantly, new trends suggest that the current 
labor flows may be different than those in the past, and, 
more transforming. For the first time, rural workers show 
signs of specialization — especially when we examine 
working behaviour by age cohort. Young workers are 
much less likely to work on the farm than older workers, 
see Table 4.1. In 2000, more than 75% of individuals 
between 16 and 25 work in the off-farm sector, almost 
double the rate of 16-to-25 year olds in 1990. Almost all 
of them live away from home. Most of them have found 
their way to the city. Changes in regulations now allow 
farmers in some cities to purchase homes and gain access 
to social services. And, perhaps most telling, almost none 
of the young workers that work in an off-farm job now 
have ever farmed. Indeed, according to both de Brauw’s 
descriptive and multivariate analysis, there is robust 
support for the conclusion that the emergence of labor 
markets are such that they will be able to transform 
China’s economy in the coming years.
Significant increase in farmers’ incomes - Rapid 
economic growth has helped to dramatically improve 
the standard of living of its people. This can be shown 
from the trend of rural per capita income increase. Per 
capita income in rural China was extremely low prior to 
the reforms. In 1978, average income per rural resident 
was only about 220 yuan per year, or about US$150. 
During the 29 years from 1949 to 1978, per capita income 
increased by only 95%, or 2.3% a year. This changed 
dramatically directly after the initiation of rural reforms 
in 1978. Per capita income increased to 522 yuan in 1984 
from 220 yuan in 1978, a growth rate of 15% a year. From 
the middle 1980s onwards, rural income continued to 
increase, but at the much slower pace of 3% annual. This 
was due mainly to a slow down in growth of agricultural 
production after the early reforms. With non-farm income 
as an increasingly large proportion of rural income, 
income increase started to accelerate since 1990s. This 
trend continued until late 1990s.
The overall achievement in the economy brought 
significant reduction in rural poverty. The significant 
reduction in the number of poor people, especially 
during the first decade, was a fact widely recognized 
both at home and abroad. In China, poverty is considered 
to be primarily a rural phenomenon. Estimated with 
China’s official poverty lines, China’s rural poor decreased 
dramatically in the past twenty years, from 260 million 
in 1978 to 128 million in 1984. After slowing down in the 
late 1980s, the rapid fall in the poverty head count 
continued in the 1990s, declining to 42 million in 1998 
and about 30 million in the year 2000. The incidence of 
rural poverty also decreased sharply during the period, 
falling from 32.9% in 1978 to 15.1% in 1984, and then to 
3% in 2000.
Emerging Commodity Markets- In part some of the 
striking changes in the off-farm sector are being facili-
tated by equally dramatic changes in China’s commodity 
markets. Since Imperial times, governments have sought 
to control grain markets and have placed food security 
at the top of its priorities. Reformers in the 1980s did not 
abandon this commitment. When transition began, 
unlike their counterparts in other transition countries, 
China’s policy makers kept tight control of agricultural 
commodity markets long after they provided incentives 
to farmers by decollectivizing agricultural production 
(Sicular, 1995). Although commodity markets were 
allowed to slowly emerge in the early 1980s, even during 
the late 1980s and mid-1990s, the government explicitly 
attempted to restrict the flow of major goods (Park et 
al., 2002).
Despite the attempts by the government to control 
markets over the past decade, agriculture markets have 
not only emerged, they have flourished, becoming more 
and more like those that exist in other nations. In a very 
real sense, the story of agricultural market development 
follows the process described by McMillan and Naughton 
(1992). In their parlance, reform, China-style, is like letting 
the ‘Genie out of the bottle.’ Gradualism opens up an 
industry or sector of the economy, providing the agents 
with initial incentives to exert more effort. The response 
of those in the sector, who initially earn substantial profits 
as new innovators, attracts more participants, which in 
turn creates competitive pressures and provides further 
impetus to expand the reforms. Soon policy makers find 
themselves facing markets that are dominated by 
multiple, profit-seeking agents that face prices set by 
supply and demand and are often unaffected by policy 
pronouncements or efforts to curb profit seeking 
activities.
The record of agricultural commodity markets shows 
that its market institutions are deepening rapidly. Park 
et al. (2002) measure the persistent fall of transaction 
costs of shipping commodities interregionally. The rise 
Table 4.2. Increasing integration of markets for 
agricultural produce
Percentage of Market Pairs that Test Positive for 
Being Integrated based on Dickey Fuller Test in Rural 
China, 1988 to 2000
Commodity 1991–
1992*
1994–
1996
1997–
2000
Percentage of integrated market pairs
Maize 46 55 93
Soybeans 56 79 95
Japonica rice 
(mostly NE, North 
and Central 
China)
67 92 96**
Note: * For maize and soybean markets: first period is 
1991-1992; for rice: first period is 1991-1993.
** There are total 28 rice markets from 1997-2000.
Results calculated by authors
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of integration is even more surprising since it passes 
through periods when the government tried to ban 
private grain sales and encourage regional self sufficiency 
(Huang et al., 2002b). By the late 1990s, prices in all pairs 
of markets-  even those remote from one another - move 
consistently together for rice, maize and soybeans, see 
Table 4.2.
Part of the rise is due to the massive effort to construct 
roads and improve communications in the 1990s (Xie, 
2002). But it is also due to the rise of hundreds of thou-
sands private traders that now arbitrage price difference 
between regions - even across long distances - for razor 
thin profit margins (Sumner et al., 2001).
Inputs market reform and rural credit services - 
Although national leaders announced efforts to relax 
restrictions on inputs during the early reform years, the 
attention given to the reform of markets for fertilizers, 
pesticides and seeds lagged behind the reforms affecting 
output commodities (Qiao, et. al. 2003). The challenges 
faced by reformers in the case of inputs also have been 
greater than for farm output. Prior to the reforms, agri-
cultural inputs almost exclusively were manufactured 
by state-owned enterprises and distributed through 
rigidly-structured state-run sales networks. Although 
implemented in a start and stop manner, reformers did 
not commit themselves to liberalize domestic fertilizer 
markets until the early 1990s. Only the pesticides market 
was liberalized in 1990s.
China started to increase fertilizer imports in the 1980s, 
however, it did not come in tandem with the liberaliza-
tion of domestic fertilizer markets. Planned fertilizer 
allocations dominated the national marketing and distri-
bution system. Almost all fertilizer factories were state-
owned and heavily subsidized (Xiao, 1998). After that, 
however, fertilizer wholesalers and retailers were 
commercialised and private trade was allowed. By 1995, 
half of China’s fertilizer was sold by non-state firms and 
in 1997 all trade limits were dropped.
During the pre-WTO years, China maintained strong 
central control of international fertilizer trade. Increased 
imports during reform did not come as a result of trade 
liberalization. Instead, rising imports were the result of 
administratively determined actions. Planners, not 
markets, guided the interface between world and 
domestic fertilizer markets. Hence it should be the admin-
istrative decision to increase imports that is given credit 
for increasing the availability of fertilizer for China’s 
producers.
The reform of rural financial system did not lead to 
much liberalization of rural credit services. Although 
efforts have been made by government to encourage 
formal credit institutions to supply services to rural 
farmers, limited progress have been achieved due to 
relatively high operational cost of working with rural 
people. Consequently, increased credit needs has led to 
activation of informal credit services in rural areas, 
although the central government has not legalised such 
institutions in rural China.
Institutional Changes in Land Management and 
Rural Enterprises -The changes occurring to land 
systems and local enterprise management demonstrate, 
perhaps more than anything else, the pervasiveness of 
the changes taking place in rural areas. The transforma-
tive nature of the changes are perhaps most surprising 
because land and local enterprises, at one time, were 
the most important assets under the control of local 
leaders (Rozelle and Boisvert, 1994).
Secure property rights are considered an important 
catalyst for economic growth, the argument being that 
investment can only flourish when there is a reasonable 
chance of reaping its rewards. Reduced risk of capital 
expropriation by the state historically has contributed 
to higher growth (North and Weingast, 1989). In the past, 
poor land rights have been blamed for low investment 
in agriculture and the absence of land rentals (Brandt et 
al., 2002). Blame has often focused on the rent-seeking 
behavior of local leaders and the rigidity of national poli-
cies. However, despite such a legacy, in most recent 
studies, the empirical evidence clearly shows that land 
rights in China are having little effect on investment and 
production (Jacoby et al., 2002). Moreover, in a recent 
survey of 1200 farm households in six provinces 
conducted by the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, 
investment histories found almost no evidence of expro-
priations of investments in the land in rural China during 
the last 10 years. A vast majority of farmers do not believe 
their land will be reallocated for the next 30 years. In 
some of the more advanced provinces, such as Zhejiang, 
rental transactions are becoming so common that one-
third of the land is being rented, levels that approach 
those found during the era before Socialism. The rise of 
rental opportunities will almost certainly allow farmers 
to begin to enlarge farm size and increase total 
earnings.
Leaders also are beginning to let go of their control 
over enterprises, instead allowing them to be owned 
and managed by private individuals and become more 
subject to the forces of markets (Kung, 1999; Li, 2001). 
Any visitor to rural China immediately notices the wide-
spread nature of the privatization movement. By the end 
of the 1990s, the move of local officials to privatize rural 
industries was deep and fundamental. Almost 90% of 
local government-owned firms have transferred their 
shares to private sectors partially or completely by 1999. 
Much of the privatization has given complete control to 
the new managers. Moreover, analysis shows that many 
of the privatization moves create new firms that are more 
efficient than those that they replaced (Li and Rozelle, 
1998). In many of the firms, although in the initial years, 
new owners lay off workers, privatized firms are begin-
ning to hire more workers and have positive employment 
impacts in the local economies. The firms that now domi-
nate rural China’s landscape are profit seeking and are 
interested in new technologies that will increase the long 
run efficiencies of their firms.
However, coupled with the positive achievements, 
there are concerns as well. These include: increased 
regional disparity; worsened environment, and looser 
Central government role as public good and service 
providers.
The economic reforms were able to bring, in broad 
terms, an increase in rural household income. However, 
owing to differences in marketing access as well as in 
basic conditions - such as fiscal health and natural 
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resources - between regions, some areas, and especially 
the coastal provinces, had much faster development than 
the others such as the northern and north-western prov-
inces. Although there were overall increases in rural 
household incomes, the difference between regions 
became lager over the time.
On the environmental side, rapid decrease of the 
groundwater table, and increased water pollution caused 
by both intensified use of agricultural chemicals as well 
as rural small industries have occurred.
The central government’s decentralising fiscal reform 
started in the middle 1990s has imposed more respon-
sibility on local governments for public goods provisions. 
Owing However, due to fiscal resources in some regions, 
limited improvements were made in terms of providing 
basic public services, such as education and health 
services.
Lessons from Chinese agricultural reforms
Although at first sight the move from a centrally- •
planned to a market economy seems a seismic shift, 
this has taken place over a couple of decades. The initial 
changes tried in the late 1970s were more modest. 
The process of reform has essentially been gradual, 
experimental, and cumulative. Reformers, moreover, 
were able to draw on the experiences of trials carried 
out in small areas during the 1960s and 1970s.
Above all, China’s reforms can be seen as pragmatic.  •
Policy-makers may have tried to maintain the princi-
ples of socialism in their overall objectives of improving 
the livelihoods of all citizens, but they have been quite 
flexible when looking for ways and means to achieve 
those ends.
China also demonstrates the extent to which early  •
gains to reform can encourage bolder changes. The 
level of success seen in the first five years or so after 
1978 was unexpectedly large, thus giving support to 
those recommending further liberalisation of markets 
for goods and factors.
New Zealand
Context of reform
Agriculture in New Zealand accounts for roughly 6% of 
GDP, but a much larger proportion of exports. Major 
agricultural activities are dairy, sheep meat and wool, 
beef and horticulture.
Historically farming in New Zealand had little govern-
ment support:
Relatively little government assistance was provided 
to agriculture until the mid-1960s. Then, following 
a number of balance of payments crises, govern-
ment began the introduction of a range of programs 
aimed at increasing production and foreign 
exchange earnings (Harris and Rae, 2006).
Support included:
Subsidised credit (introduced in 1930); •
grants to encourage pasture land development and  •
stocking (started in the mid-1970s);
subsidies for fertilizer, weed control and irrigation  •
structures (introduced between 1965 and 1975);
Various tax advantages for farmers, introduced during  •
the 1960s and 1970s; and,
An export incentive scheme that had been introduced  •
in 1963 to encourage diversification away from tradi-
tional farm exports.
Nevertheless, prior to 1980, support to agriculture was 
insufficient to compensate it for the effective taxation 
that resulted from tariff support to industrial production 
and periodic overvaluation of the exchange rate.
A major boost to farm support came through supple-
mentary minimum prices, introduced in 1978. These had 
characteristics of deficiency payments or export subsi-
dies depending on the commodity. They were introduced 
as the agricultural sector was suffering from the effects 
of increasing currency overvaluation and was failing to 
achieve growth targets set for it during an influential 
1963 public consultation (Johnson, 2001; Lattimore, 
2006). In 1980 government assistance to pastoral agri-
culture was worth 7% of output. This had risen to 39% 
by 1984, with more than two-thirds of this accounted 
for by price support and/or stabilisation measures. By 
contrast, fertiliser subsidies only accounted for 2.5% of 
support (figures quoted by Johnson et al., 1989).
Hence by the early 1980s farming was enjoying 
unprecedented levels of public support.
Reforms to New Zealand agricultural 
policy in the 1980s
The impetus for reform was a general economic crisis. 
Harris and Rae, 2006 comment:
In New Zealand, reform … was primarily a response 
to an economic crisis. … By 1984 macroeconomic 
problems were acute; heavy selling of the New 
Zealand dollar threatened to exhaust the country’s 
foreign reserves. Following an election in June 1984, 
a new administration set about a major reform 
program. Government assistance for agriculture 
was rapidly withdrawn. The New Zealand dollar was 
devalued and subsequently allowed to float. Export 
assistance was eliminated; tariffs were progressively 
lowered across-the-board; and import controls 
were dismantled, all with the objective of promoting 
international competitiveness. Later, the central 
bank was given increased autonomy in its pursuit 
of price stability [1989], and the labor market was 
deregulated. The public sector was downsized, and 
many former activities of the government were 
privatized (including agricultural extension).
Over and above the immediate problems faced, there 
was a recognition that New Zealand was failing economi-
cally in the longer run. In the early 1950s New Zealand 
was one of the richest countries in the world:24 by the 
early 1980s it had slid down the international rankings. 
(Johnston and Frengley, 1994)
Major capital flight in weeks preceding the 1984 elec-
tion led to a financial crisis after it, including the tempo-
rary cessation of forex trading. Thus the initial devaluation 
of the dollar was forced upon the new government. A 
20% devaluation of the New Zealand dollar was 
announced immediately after the election. This was 
followed by a removal of exchange controls later in the 
year, then full flotation in March 1985.
The reform package gained the name ‘Rogernomics’, 
showing the personal influence of Minister of Finance 
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(1984-88) Roger Douglas, who was given very free rein 
to shape economic policy in the years following the 1984 
election. Douglas had written a book advocating radical 
free-market reform in 1981, but this line only commanded 
partial support within the Labour Party prior to the 1984 
currency and financial crisis. Scrimgeour and Pasour, 1996 
argue that the relatively young age of the new cabinet 
also encouraged radical policies, rather than another 
attempt to apply a ‘sticking plaster’ to the economy, as 
had been done by previous governments. In addition, 
key officials in the Treasury and Commerce Department 
favoured monetarist economics and knew of the reform 
experience in Chile that had begun the previous 
decade.
For Douglas and his advisers, the fundamental problem 
was lack of international competitiveness. Restoring 
competitiveness required efficient resource allocation 
and entrepreneurship. The policy response was to achieve 
macro-economic stability and remove obstacles to enter-
prise: assuming that business, including agriculture, 
would then respond to market signals that were 
unleashed, and that private enterprise would generate 
more wealth than controlled industries facing distorted 
prices.
Macroeconomic policy included: monetarist monetary 
policy using control of the money supply to combat infla-
tion - see below on the effectiveness of this; cutting public 
spending to remove government deficits; reduction in 
personal income tax and introduction of VAT (believed 
to be a better combination for encouraging entrepre-
neurship); and, devaluation followed by flotation of the 
exchange rate. These were to be accompanied by 
progressive trade liberalisation (removal of quantitative 
import restrictions, reduction in tariffs), reduction in 
industrial assistance, financial deregulation and corpo-
ratisation of government departments (see below).
Macroeconomic policy was always the focus; sectoral 
policies were seen as sources of distortion and ineffi-
ciency to be stripped away, rather than developed. 
Agricultural reform was thus in some ways a by-product 
of a wider economic philosophy. But that may overstate 
the case. Johnson et al., 1989 report that there was a 
general political consensus even before the 1984 election 
that the level of farm support had become unsustainable. 
During the election campaign the outgoing National 
government announced that supplementary minimum 
prices would be phased out. By contrast, Labour, which 
had not traditionally received much support from the 
farming community (Scrimgeour and Pasour, 1996), was 
non-committal until after the election.
Agriculture was the first major sector to be reformed 
- it took almost a decade for support to be removed from 
some industries, even though a small start had been 
made on this before 1984. This suggests that there were 
more powerful interest groups associated with industry 
than with agriculture. (After all, historically industry in 
new Zealand had been privileged at agriculture’s 
expense).
Supplementary minimum prices were the first agri-
cultural supports to go (Scrimgeour and Pasour, 1996). 
Their value plummeted from NZ$438 million in 1983 to 
zero in 1987 (Valdés, 1994). At the same time, the govern-
ment contribution to the Meat Industry Stabilization 
Account fell from NZ$337 million in 1985 to zero in 1988 
(Valdés, 1994). Input and finance subsidies were cut in 
late 1984 as were various tax preferences for farmers in 
1985. Deregulation of domestic marketing began with 
poultry in 1986 and wheat in 1987, with milk, apples and 
pears following in 1992-93.
Support to pastoral agriculture, expressed in PSE 
terms, fell from 34% in 1984 to 23% in 1987 and 3% in 
1994 (Sandrey and Scobie, 1994). As a proportion of 
public expenditure, support to agriculture fell from 9% 
in 1983 to 7% in 1985 and 1% in 1989 (Valdés, 1994).
Process: from initial idea, through drafting 
to approval
Reforms were apparently introduced with little warning 
and few prior consultations. However, there was also 
surprisingly little opposition to the principle of reform. 
When the difficulties of adjustment faced by some 
farming households was realised, some support was 
provided specifically to assist the adjustment process 
(including exit from agriculture), rather than going back 
on the reforms themselves.
Although the Labour government was not elected on 
a deregulation mandate in 1984, the fact that it was 
re-elected in 1987 showed broad public support for the 
overall reform programme at that stage. However, this 
began to wane as growth failed to pick up and unem-
ployment rose. Real GDP was stagnant through 1985–86 
to 1991–92, following 5.6% growth in 1984–85, whilst 
unemployment had risen to 10% in 1991–92 from 4% in 
1986–87 (Johnson et al., 1989; Johnson, 1993). Roger 
Douglas was replaced as Minister of Finance in late 1988 
and a Conservative government was elected in October 
1990. Nevertheless, the new government pursued the 
same basic policy direction as Labour had done, concen-
trating on macro-economic management and looking 
to liberalisation to create the conditions for an entrepre-
neurial supply response. This showed that public senti-
ment was still broadly supportive of the changes that 
were being undertaken, even if they wished someone 
else to undertake them.
An interesting feature is that Federated Farmers (FF), 
the main farming lobby group, emerged as a significant 
supporter of economy-wide reform, particularly once 
agricultural support had been cut (Johnson, 1993). 
Having seen support to agriculture removed before 
support to other sectors- which the government had 
also stated its intention to reform - FF chose to urge 
economy-wide reforms, from which agriculture would 
benefit, rather than a return to farm support. This was 
despite the fact that the agriculture sector endured 
several tough years commencing in 1985–86, when the 
FF leadership came under some pressure from members 
to call for renewed support for agriculture (Johnston and 
Frengley, 1994).
The general support of FF for reform may have 
stemmed from there being no sustained history of 
support to farming, and that it wished to have some 
voice on specific reforms and that might be enhanced 
by a generally supportive stance. In addition, the first 
year of reform, 1984–85 was good. Subsequent problems 
were seen to be more a problem of the real exchange 
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rate as those of reform. FF may also have taken pride in 
seeing New Zealand as a leader in agricultural reform.
Scrimgeour and Pasour, 1996 argue that the position 
taken by FF can be explained in terms of a ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’.25 Farmers could either seek to secure their liveli-
hoods by devoting time and resources to rent-seeking 
activities (lobbying government to provide them with 
various protection and support measures) or could focus 
on achieving competitiveness in global markets. However, 
the pay-offs to these strategies would depend on what 
industrialists did, as protection for industrialists would 
have an impact on the competitive position of the agri-
cultural sector, in particular through exchange rate 
impacts.
This provides a reason why Federated Farmers might 
have contemplated reform even ex ante – assuming that 
they believed the Labour government’s rhetoric about 
economy-wide reform. It certainly explains why they 
lobbied hard for reform to be carried through economy-
wide once agricultural support had been cut26.
Scrimgeour and Pasour, 1996 also claim that analysis 
of the economic costs of farm support prior to 1984 
influenced the debate on farm support, making it more 
likely that such support would be cut.27 It is also plausible 
that such analysis, if it attracted high-level attention, 
could have influenced Federated Farmers’ choice of 
strategy ex ante. If they believed that their support was 
going to be cut, it perhaps made sense to embrace a 
programme of economy-wide reform, hoping that this 
would also reduce support to industry and government 
openness to rent-seeking.
The same authors add that by 1984 the public at large 
was getting tired of government regulation, whilst 
industry was growing disillusioned with the cost of rent-
seeking activity and was suffering from its loss in inter-
national competitiveness, despite the support that it was 
achieving. The offer of lower inflation, lower taxes and 
more business opportunities through privatisation, in 
exchange for lower protection and loss of subsidies, was 
a reasonable one and the New Zealand Business 
Roundtable and became a strong supporter of reform, 
along with Federated Farmers. Nevertheless, some indus-
tries proved able to negotiate a slower reduction in 
support than agriculture.
Process: implementation
In general, government agencies were reformed in a drive 
from the centre where the Treasury led the reforms. Other 
ministries were thus subjects of reform, rather than archi-
tects or drivers of it. The initial corporatisation of nine 
government departments included Lands + Surveys and 
Forestry (‘specific’ tasks, as per Israel, 1987, so ‘easy’ to 
produce management contracts), but also simultaneous 
reforms of Post Office and Telecommunications and 
electricity supply.
However, there is some evidence that reform-minded 
elements within MAF were able to collaborate with the 
Ministry of Finance and Treasury in the reform process, 
so as to shape it. Bell and Elliott (1993) present MAF as 
being fairly pro-active in instigating organisational 
change, seeing that it was coming anyway: “MAF was 
the first government department in New Zealand to go 
through major bureaucratic change. Initially, the changes 
were based on a strategic assessment of the changing 
needs of agriculture due changes in New Zealand 
farming. MAF also anticipated many of the eventual 
requirements of State sector reform. MAF took early initia-
tives rather than waiting for change to be mandatory.” 
The Minister of Agriculture at the time, Colin Moyle, does 
not appear to have been a major driving figure behind 
the reform, but there is a view that he was appointed as 
someone who would be sympathetic to, rather than 
obstructive of, MAF reform.
Reform of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
(MAF) began in 1985, when it was announced that two-
thirds of funding for quality control services and 40% of 
funding for research and extension would come from 
private sources (that is, through cost recovery) by 1990. 
The envisaged revenue amounted to 16% of MAF’s gross 
expenditure (Johnson et al., 1989, p 53). These targets 
were then raised to full cost recovery for both agricultural 
inspection and extension services by 1990–91, targets 
that were met. Meanwhile, within MAF, delivery services 
were separated from policy services, with a view to priva-
tising the former. There was, however, some debate about 
this. In July 1992, instead of privatising extension, exten-
sion personnel were organised into Agriculture New 
Zealand, a profit centre within MAF that charged both 
the government and private users for its services 
(Johnson, 1993). However, in 1994 extension provision 
was fully privatised (Scrimgeour and Pasour, 1996).
In June 1992 a shake-up of research economy-wide, 
including within agriculture, was announced. Ten ‘crown 
research institutes’ (independent institutes albeit still 
within the public sector) were established from the 
former science activities of MAF, the Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research, Forestry Research and 
the Meteorological Office. These ten included four related 
to agriculture: the Agriculture Research Institute (for 
pastoral agriculture), the Horticulture Research Institute, 
the Institute for Crop and Food Research (arable crops) 
and the Landcare Research Institute (land and ecology). 
These were to be providers of research services, working 
on contract to the Foundation for Research, Science and 
Technology (Johnson, 1993).
Prior to the onset of reform, MAF comprised ten divi-
sions and had a total staff of 5,600 (Bell and Elliott, 1993). 
By January 1995, following the changes to extension, 
research, quality management and animal and quaran-
tine services, the staff of MAF (excluding those now 
working within separate organisations) had been reduced 
to 2,263 (Scrimgeour and Pasour, 1996). The reformed 
MAF was also ‘less captive to its constituency’ (Scrimgeour 
and Pasour, 1996).
One interesting exception to the ‘radical reform’ 
approach within the agriculture sector relates to export 
marketing authorities. A review of statutory marketing 
authorities was undertaken in 1984 and those with 
domestic marketing functions were reformed. Thus, 
statutory marketing boards for wheat, milk and eggs 
were eliminated and the marketing of these products 
was deregulated. However, export marketing organisa-
tions were basically left alone (Johnson et al., 1989). Minor 
reforms of export marketing were undertaken during 
the next decade, but, as often as not, single-channel 
control of marketing was strengthened. Instead of 
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introducing competition, efforts were made to increase 
the efficiency of marketing agencies and their account-
ability to producers (Johnson, 1991). Thus, for example, 
the 1992 Dairy Board Amendment Act made the board 
more independent of government, by replacing the two 
government nominees on the board by commercial 
directors, and more accountable to the dairy industry. 
Cooperative dairy companies and their suppliers were 
made the owners of the Board’s capital and the majority 
of directors were to be elected by the dairy industry. In 
addition, more commercially-oriented financial 
accounting was introduced, along with five-yearly inde-
pendent audits of performance and efficiency (Johnson, 
1993).
This was an area where the government proceeded 
in consultation with farmers’ representatives, whose 
message was strongly in favour of retaining single-
channel marketing agencies. According to Lattimore 
(2006, p5): “Government was also astute in not disman-
tling agricultural marketing boards in the early stages 
of the reforms. These boards, particularly the Dairy Board, 
were held in high regard by many farmers because they 
had been around for a long time, were co-operative in 
nature and appeared to act as political and economic 
safety nets.” Although, according to Lattimore, there was 
“strong suspicion in analytical circles that the boards 
implicitly hindered product and market development 
rather than aided it (i.e. that they were export taxes rather 
than export subsidies)”, others believed that the market 
power benefits of a single organisation where New 
Zealand producers accounted for a significant share of 
total world supply (e.g. kiwifruit, apples, dairy) outweighed 
any additional efficiency benefits to producers that might 
come through competition (Johnson, 1993). As of 1996, 
marketing boards still influenced the marketing of 80% 
by value of New Zealand’s agriculture and horticulture 
exports and boards with statutory monopolies still 
controlled 30% (Scrimgeour and Pasour, 1996).
A key reform in the wider economy of considerable 
importance to the export agriculture was that of labour 
markets and specifically legislation affecting labour 
organisation at ports (so-called ‘waterfront’ labour). The 
Labour government was cautious about embarking on 
labour market reform, which eventually commenced with 
the Labour Relations Act in 1987, fearing that it could be 
sufficiently unpopular to derail the entire reform 
programme. However, once pay and employment 
bargaining at ports was decentralised, reducing the 
power of central trade unions, the number of workers 
was reduced considerably, port charges fell and farmers 
were able to receive a higher proportion of world prices 
for their products due to reduced marketing margins 
(Johnson, 1993; Scrimgeour and Pasour, 1996; Harris and 
Rae, 2006).
Reform of agriculture proceeded swiftly. However, 
progress in other parts of the economy was slower than 
expected and this had adverse impacts on agriculture, 
making the adjustment process more difficult. Specifically, 
it took longer than expected to get inflation under control 
after the initial devaluation and flotation of the NZ$. 
Inflation ran at 10–15% p.a. through 1985–86 to 1987–88, 
compared with 6% in 1984–85 (Johnson et al., 1989; 
Johnson, 1993). The high interest rates that 
were maintained to try to control inflation led to a real 
appreciation in the NZ dollar during this period, which 
hurt agriculture. This was exacerbated by falling world 
prices for some of New Zealand’s major agricultural prod-
ucts in 1985–86 and 1986–87. The government deficit 
was finally controlled in 1987–88 and in 1989 the Reserve 
Bank Act replaced monetarist targets as a strategy for 
controlling inflation with a single direct target, given to 
the new reserve bank, to keep inflation within the range 
0–2% a year. (Sandrey and Scobie, 1994). A decade after 
reforms began, the real exchange rate facing the trade-
able sector had ‘returned to levels comparable to the 
pre-liberalisation era’ (Sandrey and Scobie, 1994) and 
agriculture was beginning to grow again.
The government acted to mitigate hardship to farmers 
in the late 1980s:
As agricultural assistance was withdrawn following 
1984, it became apparent that the government’s 
existing social welfare provisions did not protect 
marginal and non-viable farm families. Specific 
schemes were devised, including a program for 
Special Assistance to Farming, which was in opera-
tion between 1986 and 1989. Provided certain 
criteria were met, grants were made to farmers who 
were in a critical financial position to provide for 
day-to-day living expenses. In this way, farmers and 
their families received a welfare benefit equivalent 
to the unemployment benefit rate (Chadee and 
Johnson 1994). An Exit Grant scheme was intro-
duced in 1988, to encourage farmers whose busi-
nesses were not viable to leave farming. Harris and 
Rae, 2006
Moreover, Rural Bank debt was reduced: ‘about 20% 
of the total debt owed by the farm sector was written-off, 
and about 5% of farms [where liquidation difficult to 
avoid] were sold’ (Harris and Rae, 2006). However, these 
debt reductions only began in 1987, once the pain in 
rural areas was acute (Johnston and Frengley, 1994). 
Furthermore, the Rural Bank was privatised in 1989, so 
could no longer administer government programmes 
or soft loans.
‘Government facilitated the adjustment process in 
other ways … A Rural Coordinator service, working with 
local support groups and partially funded by govern-
ment, helped with financial counseling and the develop-
ment of non-farm activities in rural areas. The Ministry 
of Agriculture established a Rural Affairs Unit to monitor 
impacts on rural communities, appointed staff to coor-
dinate strategic planning within the sector, funded a Rural 
Help Directory to advise on locally available sources of 
assistance, and funded a series of risk management semi-
nars for farmers.’ (Harris and Rae, 2006)
Outcomes
Two overall points are that it is difficult to disentangle 
effects of economy-wide reform from reforms within the 
agricultural sector; and that it is difficult to specify a 
without-reform scenario, but one would expect that to 
be fairly bleak. Note also that world prices of some of 
New Zealand’s major agricultural products, having risen 
in 1984–85, fell during the next couple of years before 
showing some recovery in 1987–88 (beef, wool) and 
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1988–90 (all). The price falls exacerbated the pain of 
adjustment for farmers.
Overall, the economy took longer to resume growth 
after the reform period than expected.
Agricultural production - see Figure 5.1
At the aggregate level real agricultural output, 
which had increased during the early 1980s, did 
not decline over the remainder of the decade when 
farming was undergoing adjustment to deregula-
tion. In fact, real output remained largely static from 
1985 until 1990. It was the composition of output 
that changed in response to changes in relative 
prices during this period, rather than total output 
(Harris and Rae, 2006).
The production of sheep and beef comprised 44% of 
the value of total agricultural output in 1984. Producers 
of these commodities were also the most heavily assisted, 
with total assistance that amounted to over 38% of the 
value of farm output in 1983: hence they bore the brunt 
of reforms.
The impact of deregulation on the production of 
sheep and beef was rapid. The number of sheep 
declined from 70.3 million in 1983 to 60.5 million 
six years later with consequent reductions in sheep 
meat and wool production. To some extent sheep 
were replaced by beef cattle and newly establishing 
farmed-deer and goat enterprises - between 1983 
and 1988, the number of beef cattle rose from 4.5 
million to 4.9 million, but fell back to 4.5 million the 
following year. Over the same period the number 
of farmed deer rose from 0.2 million to 0.8 million; 
farmed goat numbers rose from 0.15 million to 1.2 
million. Since then, the goat industry has all but 
disappeared, but the deer industry has continued 
to develop. Using three-year averages based on 
1984 and 1990, sheep meat production declined 
by 19% over the period; wool fell by 14%; and beef 
and veal production increased by 10% (Harris and 
Rae, 2006)
By contrast, fruit took off during reform period, to 
exceed wool, cattle or sheep by 1990. Dairy production 
was always largest sub-sector, but doubled in early 
1990s.
Elimination of input subsidies was partially offset by 
reductions in trade controls (tradable inputs) and control 
of inflation 1989- (non-tradables), such that input price 
inflation greatly reduced post-reform. Sharp falls in both 
fertiliser use and spending on repairs and maintenance 
were seen from 1985 to 1989: one area where economies 
could be made, as loan repayments soared with higher 
interest rates, thanks in part to removal of interest rate 
controls in 1984.
Despite falling input use, maintained output was 
maintained. Total factor productivity (TFP) grew at 1% 
p.a. 1976–84, but at 2% p.a. 1984–1990, and 2.3% p.a. 
1990–1997. Agricultural value added rose in 1985, fell in 
1986–87, but has subsequently grown with economy 
since - maintaining a roughly constant 6% share of 
GDP.
Rising profitability in New Zealand agriculture by the 
early 1990s contrasted with static or falling profits in 
Australia, despite a similar level of output growth. The 
New Zealand sector - and the economy more widely - had 
been more successful in controlling its costs (Johnson, 
1993).
Producer incomes - price support was reduced between 
1984 and 1987. The effects were partly offset by 
Source: data from FAOSTAT
Figure 5.1. New Zealand. Agricultural production from 1978 to 2005
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devaluation in 1984 and rising world prices for wool, 
lamb/mutton and beef 1984–85. Exchange rate apprecia-
tion 1986–88 had the opposite effect and rising domestic 
marketing margins over reform period also had negative 
impact on prices received by farmers. Nevertheless, 
overall between 1985 and 1989 farm gate prices for wool 
and beef rose, prices for lamb fell much less than support 
payments (-6 NZc/kg p.a. c/w –23.4 NZc/kg p.a.); only for 
mutton did prices fall more than support payments (-4.4 
NZc/kg p.a. c/w –1.8 NZc/kg).
Annual surveys of incomes from sheep and beef farm 
incomes show that incomes and profits - that had actually 
been falling from 1980 to 1984, despite rising revenues 
- rose in 1985, fell in 1986, then rose gradually since. The 
revenue trend was fairly constantly upwards, with 1985 
and 1986 as deviations either side.
Rising levels of farm indebtedness were one result of 
the reform programme that had long-term conse-
quences. Falling levels of agricultural support were criti-
cally reflected in lower land prices, yet some farmers were 
repaying debts that were incurred when land prices were 
much higher. A positive side to this is that it contributed 
to the reduced input use and higher TFP achieved within 
New Zealand agriculture during the 1980s, in contrast 
to Australia. However, it also discouraged investment in 
farming more generally, thus possibly reducing post-
adjustment growth: ‘Like the Great Depression, the 
impact of deregulation continues to temper the financial 
decisions of a generation of farmers’ (Johnston and 
Frengley, 1994, p 1039).
Consumer welfare - consumer may have gained from 
deregulation of domestic marketing arrangements 
leading to lower consumer prices and greater choice, 
but the major focus of reform was always export 
competitiveness.
Effects on the environment - Arguably positive changes 
in land use were seen:
The fall in the profitability of sheep enterprises rela-
tive to other types of farming led to major changes 
in land use patterns. Over the ten years from 1984 
to 1994, the area of grassland devoted to sheep 
and beef cattle declined by 1.93 million ha, or by 
16 percent. Of this, 1.08 million ha (56 percent) were 
changed to other grassland uses, such as dairy 
farming, and diverse uses such as vineyards, other 
horticulture, and semi-urban ‘lifestyle’ blocks. The 
remaining 850,000 ha of diverted land was devoted 
to forestry or involved retirement of marginal lands 
(Davison 1996b)
Other effects - Investment in farm capital stock fell as 
interest rates rose, insufficient to offset depreciation, so 
total capital stock on farms fell. Farm values fell. 
Agricultural land prices fell relative to urban, but recov-
ered in 1990s. Despite this there were fewer bankruptcies 
than feared, perhaps in part owing to the debt write-offs 
by both state-owned Rural Bank and informal (e.g. family) 
lenders.
There may have been some loss of jobs. Harris and 
Rae, 2006 report an estimated an ‘11% drop in farm labor 
employed during 1986-91’, allowing for trend decline 
due to technical change. In absolute terms, equal falls 
were seen in farm owners and employees (dispropor-
tionately more employees), with younger owners faring 
worse because of less equity. Also, job losses were expe-
rienced in port handling as part of wider labour market 
reforms (1987–91).
Lessons from New Zealand’s agricultural 
reforms
Overall, New Zealand now has a competitive agricul- •
tural sector with some of the lowest levels of protection 
and support in the world. Farmers demonstrated 
impressive flexibility in responding to the reform 
programme. Some labour was shed during the transi-
tion and some farms went out of business, although 
the latter were mainly in more marginal production 
areas, so their demise is seen as an environmental ‘plus’. 
Reservations about the reform process focus on the 
impact of lagged reform elsewhere in the economy 
- difficulties in controlling inflation, hence real exchange 
rate appreciation; lags in labour market reform - on 
the pain of adjustment experienced by farmers, rather 
than on ‘unwelcome side effects’ per se.
The reform of the agricultural sector encountered  •
surprisingly little opposition. Even Federated Farmers 
accepted it and advocated the completion of the 
reform agenda elsewhere in the economy, rather than 
a return to agricultural support, when the adjustment 
process was at its most painful for farmers.
The New Zealand experience perhaps needs to be kept  •
in perspective. Although the reforms were radical, they 
took place in the context of a well-established economy 
that had reasonably well functioning institutions, and 
several sectors - above all in agriculture - that had for 
decades been amongst world’s leading producers, 
skilled at selling to (very distant) international markets. 
While the economic difficulties were real enough, they 
were more the perturbations of an advanced economy, 
rather than the deep crises that have been seen in 
many developing countries. It is perhaps not that 
surprising that adjustment and recovery were achieved 
at relatively low cost.
Conclusions
This chapter compares the experiences of the four coun-
tries, looking in turn at the context, content, process and 
outcomes of reforms. At the end we draw preliminary 
lessons for agricultural policy reform in Africa.
Context of Reform
In all four cases, agricultural reform was undertaken in 
response to a perceived crisis, either economic or political 
or both. In all cases with the possible exception of China, 
reforms were undertaken following a change of 
government.
In Bangladesh presidential assassination and a series  •
of military coups in 1975 ushered in a gradualist 
programme of economic reform, beginning with 
attempts to establish macro-economic stability. The 
political calamities of 1975 followed a terrible famine 
in 1974, which highlighted the chronic poverty, food 
insecurity and vulnerability of the Bangladesh popula-
tion. Nevertheless, agricultural policy reform proceeded 
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gradually, with reform of agricultural input markets 
being the first step in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
In China agricultural and rural market reform began  •
in 1978 once Deng Xiaoping had consolidated his 
power following the death of Mao Zedong. Mao’s 
period in power had perhaps laid some of the founda-
tions for future growth of the Chinese economy, but 
in the late 1970s economic growth was slow and rural 
poverty was widespread, with severe food shortages 
experienced in some years in the 1970s. The Chinese 
leadership knew that it had to change its agricultural 
policies if it was to reverse this situation and maintain 
its credibility with its citizens.
Market-oriented agricultural reform in Chile  •
commenced following the military coup of General 
Pinochet in 1973. Agricultural reform was part of a 
radical reform of the entire Chilean economy, in which 
state intervention gave way to liberalised markets, and 
in which policies for growth and development switched 
from favouring substitution of imports to an export 
orientation. In addition to growing dissatisfaction with 
the performance of the Chilean economy during its 
import-substitution phase, General Pinochet’s reforms 
aimed to restore the power of Chile’s traditional landed 
classes, in particular by reversing a land redistribution 
started by President Frei and intensified by the man 
whom Pinochet replaced, Salvador Allende.
The reform of the New Zealand economy during the  •
1980s was arguably as radical as that undertaken 
during the Pinochet dictatorship, but was undertaken 
in a democratic and peaceful context. In the early 1980s 
the economy was hit by macroeconomic crisis, most 
clearly seen in heavy selling of the NZ dollar. There 
was, moreover, a widespread sense that the economy 
was failing: in the early 1950s New Zealand was one 
of the five richest economies in the world, judged on 
incomes a head. But thirty years later the country had 
slipped down the rankings - to around 17th place - as 
its economy became one of the slowest growing in 
the OECD. The incoming Labour government in 1984 
was immediately faced with a foreign exchange crisis 
and quickly embarked on a radical overhaul of the 
entire economy designed to increase international 
competitiveness. Agriculture was the first sector to 
undergo reform.
What is noticeable here is that the crisis perceived was 
not specifically agricultural, nor even rural: in all four 
cases, a national problem affecting the whole economy 
was perceived. Is this just the result of examining a small 
sample of cases, or would such a result apply more 
widely? Examples of other cases where important 
changes to agricultural policy followed a more general 
crisis include: Mexico 1988, Kenya 1954, Indonesia 1967, 
Vietnam 1986, Bolivia 1952, and Nicaragua 1979. Looking 
for cases of major changes to agricultural policy that 
followed crises that could be seen as specifically agricul-
tural, rural or concerned with food, the cases of India in 
1965 and 1966, Ethiopia in 1975 - where agricultural crisis 
led to revolution, stand out. It may be that the latter cases 
are exceptional.
An important aspect of context was the role of agri-
culture in the economy. In Bangladesh and China, the 
rural areas were still home to the large majority of the 
population. Farming was still a major source of income 
for very large numbers of households. The rural areas 
were also disproportionately poor. In Chile even by the 
early 1970s the majority of the population were urban: 
agriculture was a relatively small part of the economy 
set against mining, urban manufacturing and services. 
New Zealand was also largely urban: but in this case, 
although farming was not a major employer, it was the 
key sector for export earnings and was thus strategically 
central to the economy.
Content
Since in these four cases the trigger for reform was a 
national problem, it is not surprising to see that agricul-
tural reform was in all cases part of a wider set of measures 
designed to affect the entire economy. In all four cases, 
the national programme included liberalisation of 
markets and a retreat of the state from intervening in 
the economy. This has subsequently become the received 
wisdom throughout much of the world: in the 1970s 
when three of the four reforms began, the direction taken 
was radical, especially in the case of Chile in 1973.
The main difference was the pace and sequencing of 
the reforms.
In Chile and New Zealand the approach taken was to  •
stabilise the macro-economy and open up productive 
sectors to international trade, stripping them of a range 
of policy supports that they had previously enjoyed. 
In both cases, reformers tried to push through their 
programmes quickly, convinced that the sooner 
changes were made, the better. However, in neither 
case was the full package of reform implemented 
overnight: some elements took time to carry out, either 
owing to the administrative demands or to the need 
to mobilise political will and energies.
Both Bangladesh and China saw reforms brought in  •
more gradually. This may reflect guarded expectations 
of the reaction of the private sector: while in the cases 
of Chile and New Zealand the reformers were convinced 
that private enterprise would invest once the dead 
hand of government was removed, few had the same 
convictions in Bangladesh and China - indeed, in both 
these cases, some leaders were suspicious of private 
business. In addition, and this probably applies to the 
case of China, leaders preferred incremental change 
allowing time to learn lessons and make adjustments 
to more drastic changes.28
When examining the agricultural content of the 
reforms, in many cases these were the sectoral concomi-
tants of a more general strategy, as seen for example in 
the liberalisation of markets for agricultural produce and 
inputs, in reducing subsidies, and in reducing the extent 
of state intervention in production and markets.
But there were some specifically agricultural elements. 
In Chile, for example, soon after the 1973 coup the 
government moved to reverse the redistributive land 
reforms of the previous two governments: partly restoring 
land to previous owners, partly regularising titles, and 
partly dispossessing those rural leaders seen as sympa-
thetic to the toppled government. Subsequently some 
targeted support, preferential access to credit and acqui-
sition of state enterprises at prices below the market 
value, was provided to emerging companies interested 
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in fruit and forestry production for export. In New Zealand 
measures to mitigate hardship to farmers were brought 
in a few years after the start of reforms.
In all cases, the reforms saw the scope of public agen-
cies reduced, although we do not mean to imply that 
this is the only direction that reform can take.
In Bangladesh, the government agency for providing  •
inputs, the BADC, saw its functions curtailed. Significant 
cuts in staff were made in the Ministry of Food when 
some of the programmes for public procurement and 
distribution of grain were ended.
In Chile, public sector reform entailed privatisation of  •
state enterprises and withdrawal of the state from 
direct intervention in economic activity; some public 
agencies providing agricultural services -  particularly 
to poor peasants - were closed. Staff were lost from 
the Ministry of Agriculture, especially those seen as 
sympathetic to the previous government.
In New Zealand a thorough reform of the Ministry of  •
Agriculture and Fisheries was undertaken in which, 
even after allowing for staff redeployment to new 
autonomous agencies, about 40% of staff lost their 
jobs. Functions such as extension and quality inspec-
tion were transferred to the private sector, as MAF 
rethought its role within the country’s changing agri-
cultural sector. Other functions, related to administra-
tion of support payments, simply disappeared as a 
result of the wider reform measures. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, there was a willingness within MAF to consider 
and even initiate changes, which may have headed 
off even more radical proposals for scrapping the 
organisation.
The process and politics of reform
As described, the trigger for reforms in these cases was 
a crisis affecting the economy in general and this gave 
the incoming governments a mandate to make substan-
tial changes. In all cases, the new leaders of the countries 
had a vision of change and were prepared to bring this 
about. It helped that in three of the cases, the reforming 
governments were not subject to full democratic scru-
tiny: two military administrations in power after coups, 
and a single-party state. In the cases of Bangladesh and 
Chile, the leaders were able to present themselves as 
restoring order to a previously chaotic situation. Certainly 
in Chile, General Pinochet’s governments benefited for 
many years from the support of the middle and upper 
classes and business interests who were grateful for the 
restoration of order and protection of their property. 
Hence although large sections of the population may 
have doubted the reforms, including some who were 
direct losers from the measures taken, they could be 
ignored.
In New Zealand, where this condition did not apply, 
it seemed the elected government benefited from a 
widespread acknowledgment that change was needed. 
Indeed, the outgoing National party pledged to scrap 
the main source of farm support during the 1984 election 
campaign.29 Even the main farming lobby group, 
Federated Farmers, soon came out as vocal supporters 
of economy-wide reform: convinced that farmers would 
benefit as much from improved efficiency in sectors such 
as transport, as they would lose from less direct 
support.
Given the trigger being national crisis, the response 
was thus primarily a national one, not a specifically agri-
cultural one. Thus the politics of agricultural reform were 
subsumed within national debates on overall economic 
strategy. Indeed, in three of the cases, important reforms 
were seemingly imposed on agriculture and the state 
agencies concerned with the sector by policy-makers 
and advisors situated in more powerful parts of the 
government, including the ministry of finance. This is 
clearly true in both Chile and New Zealand where policy 
prescriptions for agriculture flowed directly from a strong 
philosophy regarding the nature of reform that the 
economy as a whole needed, espoused strongly be senior 
officials in the ministry of finance.
The desire to cut public spending so as to control infla-
tion was also a centrally-driven motive for reform of the 
institutions responsible for agriculture, along with the 
philosophical belief that sectoral policy was closely asso-
ciated with distortion of incentives facing producers.
Technocrats played significant roles in the cases of 
Chile and New Zealand. In the former, a group of Chilean 
economists trained at the University of Chicago and 
hence known as the ‘Chicago Boys’ had a central role in 
the design of the policy. In New Zealand the broad reform 
package gained the name ‘Rogernomics’, showing the 
personal influence of Minister of Finance (1984–88) Roger 
Douglas. However, he was assisted by key officials in the 
Treasury and Commerce Department, who were inspired 
by the latest thinking in neoclassical and monetarist 
economics and knew of the reform experience in Chile 
that had begun the previous decade.
In Bangladesh a research team in the Ministry of Food 
was to play an important role in the second round of 
reforms, affecting grain marketing and distribution.
China is unusual as a case where policy-makers were 
able to benefit from experiments on a limited scale. A 
trial version of the household responsibility system had 
been run in one of the very poor counties of southern 
China, but, once brought to the attention of the central 
leadership, was quickly adopted throughout the country. 
Paradoxically, the regime that most clearly identified itself 
as committed to an ideology - socialism - proved to be 
highly pragmatic.
None of the reforms necessarily went smoothly: all 
were marked by adjustments and indeed, some impor-
tant deviations from the initial schemes were seen. Given 
the more comprehensive nature of reforms in Chile and 
New Zealand than in China and Bangladesh, it is perhaps 
not surprising to find that there were also some ‘fits and 
starts’ in implementation in both these countries.
This was most clearly seen in Chile, where observers  •
pick out three or even four phases of reforms in the 
sixteen years that General Pinochet led the country. 
Reform gathered momentum in the latter part of the 
1970s following a cautious start during 1973–75. This 
owed much to the influence of the so-called ‘Chicago 
Boys’. However, the global economic downturn, the 
Latin American debt crisis and collapse in world 
commodity prices at the beginning of the 1980s 
presented a major challenge for an economy that had 
been opened to the international scene. In 1982 Chile 
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was facing a severe economic recession and the agri-
culture sector was strongly hit. In a short-lived reversal 
of policy, the ‘Chicago Boys’ were largely dismissed 
from their positions of policy influence and the govern-
ment was forced – crucially by the long faithful busi-
ness elite supporters – to reverse the neo-liberal model 
and play a more active role in the economy and in the 
agriculture sector in particular. Tariffs, credit facilities 
and price guarantees were reintroduced and the debts 
of agricultural entrepreneurs were renegotiated with 
state support. When a reform path was resumed in 
1983-84, it was a pragmatic form of neo-liberalism in 
contrast to the more radical ideologically-driven 
approach of the later 1970s. This is argued however 
to have emerged out of short-run political calculation 
– a response to pressures coming mainly from domes-
tically-oriented businesses and large food-crop 
producers – rather than deliberate policy design (Kurtz, 
1999).
In New Zealand, the main test of the government’s  •
will to carry through its agricultural sector reform 
occurred during 1986–88 when an appreciating real 
exchange rate (due to the government’s use of tight 
monetary policy and high interest rates to try to get 
inflation under control) and low international 
commodity prices caused considerable pain to farmers 
who were still adjusting to the shock of the removal 
of price support. Either side of the 1987 election, a 
number of measures were introduced to ease the pain 
of adjustment felt by the agricultural sector whilst the 
fruits of reform were yet to be seen elsewhere in the 
economy. These measures included: a programme for 
Special Assistance to Farming, which was in operation 
between 1986 and 1989; an Exit Grant scheme, which 
was introduced in 1988 to encourage farmers whose 
businesses were not viable to leave farming; debt 
write-offs by the main rural lender, the state-owned 
Rural Bank, during 1987–89 (before the Rural Bank was 
privatised), and the provision of various services 
deigned to help farmers with financial counseling and 
the development of non-farm activities in rural areas. 
A notable aspect of the support provided to farming 
households in the late 1980s, however, was that it was 
provided specifically to assist the process of adjust-
ment to the new, competitive market conditions 
(including exit from agriculture for farms in marginal 
areas that were unlikely to be viable without state 
support). The support in no way represented a retreat 
on the basic thrust of the reforms themselves.
In China official enthusiasm for markets in essential  •
foods has been tempered when prices have risen, and 
the state has sought to re-impose price controls and 
obligatory procurement. In Bangladesh, a fertiliser 
shortage arose in 1994–95 that led to partial reversal 
of reforms, with the state reintroducing controls over 
dealers.
The main contrast again arises when comparing Chile 
and New Zealand to Bangladesh and China. In the former 
widespread reform was contemplated from the start, and 
reforms were made generally as soon as they could practi-
cally be carried out. In the latter cases the initial intentions 
seem to have more modest, reforms were introduced in 
waves and it seems that initial success with reforms then 
encouraged wider and deeper measures.
Outcomes of Reform
Once again, the two Asian cases contrast with other two. 
In Bangladesh and China, the modest initial measures 
taken paid off within a year or two. In both cases, food 
production for the domestic market increased well ahead 
of population growth: a valuable gain for countries that 
were very poor at the time and where the availability 
and price of food was a key issue.
In Bangladesh the price of fertiliser fell after the private 
sector assumed responsibility for input supply, despite 
the ending of input subsidies at the time of the reform. 
This was partly a result of fortuitous international condi-
tions, partly owing to of private suppliers being more 
efficient than the BADC. As a result fertiliser use rose 
dramatically. At the same time, liberalisation of the import 
of irrigation equipment allowed an equally dramatic 
expansion of tubewells. Rice production rose strongly 
enough to see rice prices fall by 50% in real terms over 
two decades. Partly as a result, when public procurement 
and distribution of grains was ended a decade later, there 
was little opposition to the ending of subsidised rice 
rations for poor consumers.
In Chile and New Zealand the response of farming to 
the changes was delayed, by a dozen years in the first 
case and by half that time in the latter. Two reasons 
relevant to both cases may explain the lag in response. 
First, some of the measures undertaken to stabilise the 
macro-economy - higher interest rates, less public 
spending - had deflationary effects.
Second, many farms changed their production mix 
and techniques. In Chile the shift was from producing 
staple foods for the domestic market towards fruit, wine, 
nuts and other high-value crops for export. Exporting 
was clearly a challenge requiring learning about distant 
markets, achieving standards, and investing in the neces-
sary equipment for processing and packing - a process 
that was assisted by the entry of foreign capital.
In New Zealand farmers knew all about exporting, but 
they shifted their production mix away from sheep and 
beef cattle towards horticulture. New Zealand farmers 
also found that they cut their costs of production, the 
advantages outweighing any loss of production.
Success was probably seen faster in Bangladesh and 
China, since the changes implemented were designed 
to stimulate farmers to increase production of crops and 
livestock that they knew well, for domestic markets that 
they knew equally well. In short, farmers had to make 
fewer adjustments. The main challenges in the two Asian 
cases was to encourage the emergence of private entre-
preneurs in the supply chains: input dealers, credit inter-
mediaries traders and processors.
Lessons for Africa and other would-be 
reformers
Clearly, reform does not take place without political will. 
These cases support the hypothesis that significant 
changes only emerge from crises. But crisis is not the 
only requirement - if it were, Africa would lead the world 
in reforms. There has also to be a political response to 
crisis, usually a change of administration that has a 
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mandate to act. This too is not sufficient: there has to be 
a reasonably coherent vision of strategic change amongst 
leaders and their policy advisers, a sense that change is 
imperative.
The dangers are that crisis leads not to strong govern-
ments with mandates, but to weak coalitions of divergent 
interests. Not only do such regimes lack the political 
capital to see through major changes, they may find it 
difficult to formulate a vision that is widely accepted. 
Without vision and determination, governments then 
become highly susceptible to rent-seeking by interest 
groups, populism, and the servicing of patron-client 
networks. Arguably this is precisely what has happened 
in response to many crises seen in contemporary 
Africa.
External conditions matter as well: they can help or 
hinder reforms. Few countries can choose the moments 
when external conditions are suitable for reform: windows 
of opportunity for domestic policy reform may have to 
be seized irrespective of international market conditions. 
Reformers may have little influence over the precise time 
at which reforms are introduced. In most cases it is thus 
a question of designing measures in the light of external 
conditions - and hoping that they are advantageous.
In Bangladesh, a fortuitous occurrence was that diesel  •
and fertiliser prices fell on international markets as 
domestic input market reforms were implemented. 
This meant that fertiliser market liberalisation could 
be accomplished with no increase in fertiliser prices, 
despite the ending of fertiliser subsidies as part of the 
reforms, whilst expansion of tubewell irrigation could 
complement increasing fertiliser use in raising rice 
production.
In Chile the radical opening of the economy to inter- •
national trade, combined with the removal of 
protection and reduction of public services, exposed 
the economy, and agriculture in particular, to the vaga-
ries of international markets. The rapid reduction in 
public spending, high real interest rates, competition 
from international agricultural producers, and, crucially, 
the decline in the real exchange rate during 1978–82 
damaged heavily Chilean agriculture. Consequently, 
farmers lobbied for protection and during 1984-90 the 
neo-liberal reform package was softened and made 
more pragmatic. Measures were introduced to achieve 
real devaluation of the exchange rate and regain 
competitiveness in international markets, in addition 
to the reintroduction of some price stabilisation inter-
ventions. Yet a fundamental challenge remained 
regarding the stabilisation of the real exchange rate, 
a variable a government can only influence indirectly 
since it is strongly determined by exogenous changes 
in terms of trade and world interest rates.30
In New Zealand devaluation of the dollar (NZ$)  •
combined with rising international commodity prices 
to raise farm gate prices and farm incomes in 1984–85, 
the first year of reform, despite the first significant 
reductions in farm support payments. However, over 
the next two years movements in both the exchange 
rate and international commodity prices worked 
against producers, making the adjustment to the more 
competitive market environment considerably more 
difficult than it would otherwise have been.
This was less true for China, not only because reform 
focused on production for the domestic market, but also 
because the Chinese market was so large and closed 
that external conditions were minor considerations.
Should reform packages be comprehensive and swift 
- the ‘big bang’, or gradual and phased? Big bang has the 
advantages of changing while there is the political will, 
often taking opponents by surprise and giving them little 
Policy measure Challenges faced Conditioning variables
Opening the economy to 
the international market
The fate of domestic sectors producing 
tradables that are not competitive 
Linking potentially competitive sectors 
to the international market, enabling or 
assisting them to realise their potential
Competitiveness of the economy
Price levels and trends in interna-
tional markets for products and 
inputs
Reducing the role of the 
state and increasing that of 
markets
Overcoming vested interests, both those 
that benefit from state support and 
entrenched ideas within public agencies
Political will
State agencies as regula-
tors of markets
Building the competence of civil 
servants with little prior experience
Competence and experience of the 
public service
Increased role for the 
private sector in supplying 
inputs, marketing, and in 
financial intermediation
Ensuring that an enabling environment 
is in place for entrepreneurs, overcoming 
co-ordination failures, ensuring that 
institutions set standards, and in general 
that information is available to market 
participants
Experience and ability of established 
businesses in the economy The 
degree of development of economic 
institutions
Increased role for farmers 
in learning about markets 
and their demands
A stiff challenge when the markets in 
question are international
Experience of farmers in exporting. 
Farmer literacy, numeracy, access to 
information, and access to capital
Possible increased role for 
producer organisations
Building competent and accountable 
associations
Experience of farmer organisation
Table 6.1: The challenges of agricultural reforms
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chance to obstruct change. If, however, producers are 
to respond to new incentives and opportunities it does 
require functioning markets and indeed a set of economic 
institutions in place. It also requires capacity and compe-
tence within the public service.
Gradual approaches, on the other hand, run the risks 
of being waylaid, and may just delay the adoption of key 
measures. But they have the advantages that they allow 
for some learning; they may be administratively feasible 
when the civil service has limited capacity; and if initial 
measures are successful, they may whet the appetite of 
leaders and the public for further reforms.
The choice may be more apparent than real. Some 
reforms are relatively simple and swift to carry out, 
requiring little more than high level policy advice and a 
ministerial decision - think, for example, of altering a tariff, 
changing central bank interest rates, or even adjusting 
government budgets. Others inherently require more 
time and more staff: think, for example, of restructuring 
a ministry, privatising a state-owned enterprise, or redis-
tributing land. By and large, most measures for macro-
economic stabilisation belong to the first category; 
structural changes, institution building, and many other 
measures that enhance supply response belong to the 
second.
Table 6.1 sets out the challenges seen in different 
aspects of agricultural reform. As can be readily seen 
from the third column, the challenges and difficulties of 
reform depend heavily on conditions that are particular 
to countries. Hence the feasibility of reform, the pace 
and sequencing of reform, are matters that require 
considerable adaptation to circumstances. There may 
then be less room to choose the pace and sequence of 
reform than may be imagined. Since political choices do 
not have to be rational, and rarely are fully informed, it 
is perfectly possible to misjudge the feasible range, pace 
and sequence of reforms.
Given such uncertainties, there is something to be 
said for a prior preference for gradual reform, since this 
avoids large mistakes and allows more time for learning 
and adjustment. It may be just coincidence, but the two 
countries that took a more gradual approach to reform 
took no longer to see the rewards of reform than the two 
that opted for big bangs.31
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End Notes
1 What do we mean by agricultural policy ‘reform’? 
Reform implies, in this case, a set of policy changes that 
are both reasonably wide in their coverage or their 
impacts, and that are sufficiently strong to cause 
significant changes to the incentives facing producers, 
and thereby to trigger equally significant responses in 
production. More prosaically, reform implies policy 
changes that imply a break with previous policies, 
where new ways of reaching overall goals are 
embraced.
2 In the first thirty years as an independent country, 
Bangladesh experienced severe floods in 1974, 1987 
and 1998; and catastrophic cyclones in 1985, 1989 and 
1991. 
3 Gwynne and Kay (1997) argue that the only 
distinguishing feature of neo-liberal agrarian policy was 
the land counter-reform. Agricultural policy was, during 
the 1970s, mostly defined by accident rather than by 
intent, with the key agricultural parameters being 
determined by the wider economic policies.
4 In 1979, more than 50% of Chile’s land was held in 
plots of less than 20 hectares, considered small by 
Chilean standards (Jarvis et al., 2004).
5 The ISI model was based on the promotion of 
industrial production through interventions such as 
subsidies to the emerging industrial sector, overvalued 
exchange rates to cheapen machinery and 
technological imports, and high tariffs on foreign 
consumer goods.
6 According to Taylor (2001) the development of the 
interventionist state was a process driven by societal 
struggles. Through greater interventionism the state 
attempted to harness the working classes to capitalist 
development, control the emergence of subversive 
ideologies, and provide the economic and social 
stability necessary for sustained accumulation and 
reproduction of capitalism. The combination of 
increased interventionism and neo-liberal economic 
development was reinforced during Eduardo Frei’s 
administration (1964–1970) and strongly backed by the 
US.
7 In 1965, 55% of Chile’s agricultural land, measured in 
terms of productive capacity, was held in about 5,000 
farms, while the remaining 45% of land was held in 
238,000 smaller farms. About 43% of land was 
expropriated between 1965 and 1973 and nearly all 
large farms were partly or whole expropriated (Jarvis et 
al., 2004).
8 The principle of ‘state subsidiarity’ was central to the 
neo-liberal model. It means that the state should have a 
complementary role, intervening only when the private 
role fails. In Chile it meant the withdrawal of the state 
from an active role in promoting economic and social 
development.
9 Although the selection of beneficiaries had a welfare 
rationale it purposely excluded those who had been 
leaders of farm workers (Jarvis et al., 2004).
10 Which contributed to strengthen the agrarian 
bourgeoisie and urban conglomerates who had 
financial capital to acquire these businesses - usually at 
well below their real value (Silva, 1990).
11 Peasant farmers who had received land during the 
land expropriations (under Frei and Allende).
12 The reforms are said to have been strongly influenced 
by large conglomerates. They had preferential access to 
international credit and purchased state enterprises at 
prices below market value: ‘Within the decade a 
handful of major economic groups grew to control 
some 68% of the assets of all corporations operating on 
the Chilean stockmarket. They also accounted for 45% 
of all foreign capital borrowed as of 1977 and, by 1980, 
42% of all banking capital in Chile and 60% of all 
available and extended credit’ (Taylor, 2001: 7).
13 Friedman was the leading proponent of the 
monetarist school of economic thought. He maintained 
that there is a close and stable link between inflation 
and the money supply, mainly that the phenomenon of 
inflation is to be regulated by controlling monetary 
emission. He rejected the use of fiscal policy as a tool of 
demand management, and argued that the 
government’s role in the guidance of the economy 
should be severely restricted.
14 An example of this was the opposition between two 
important landowner associations. The Sociedad 
Nacional de Agricultura (SNA) accepted the export-
oriented agriculture model (although criticizing the 
reform austerity) while the Confederación de 
Productores Agrícolas (CPA) strongly disapproved of 
the model, calling instead for an integral agricultural 
development with modernization and increased 
production in all the main components of Chilean 
agriculture (P. Silva, 1993).
15 Kurtz distinguishes four different policy reform 
periods: economic crisis and initial repression (1973–
75), neo-liberal economics versus corporatist politics 
(1975–78), emergence of the neo-liberal model 
(1979–82), and reconstruction of a bourgeois political 
coalition (1982–89).
16 Fixed-asset producers for external markets (mining 
and fruit industry), large-scale merchants and even 
landowners who were not internationally competitive 
but resented ISI bias against their sector (E. Silva, 1993).
17 These conglomerates had privileged access to 
international banking and were in a privileged position 
to benefit from further liberalisation and deregulation. 
These conglomerates activities concentrated in 
liquid-assets sectors, primary commodity exports and 
internationally competitive manufactures for domestic 
markets. (E. Silva, 1993)
18 The landowners commissioned a independent 
diagnostic study of agriculture which recommended an 
increase in flexibility and a relaxation in the application 
of neo-liberal policies and the adoption of fiscal and 
financial measures in support of agrarian producers (P. 
Silva, 1993).
19 To protect national producers from imports of 
subsidised agricultural products.
20 The FAOSTAT data suggest more modest growth over 
this period, of around 5.5% a year. The difference lies in 
one source using a measure of value, the other being a 
production index. Presumably over this period there 
was an increase in the overall value per unit of output 
of Chilean produce.
21 Exports of fresh fruit, lumber and forestry grew from 
7.6% of total exports in 1971 to 20.5% in 1981 (Taylor, 
2001). In agriculture 8 large firms accounted for 80.6% 
of the export market share and in forestry 5 firms 
accounted for 78.4% (ibid).
22 It has been argued that policy makers did not want 
land reform to succeed and policies towards 
beneficiaries reflected this. For example, the selection 
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of beneficiaries of land redistribution excluded, for 
political reasons,
23 Under the commune system prior to the reform, 
production and distribution of all agricultural 
commodities were controlled by the Government. 
Farmers were only allowed to retain basic amount of 
products for self-consumption, all remaining amount 
had to be delivered to state marketing agencies.
24 According to Penn World Tables, only the USA, 
Luxembourg and Switzerland had higher real levels of 
GDP per capita at the time
25 Formally they present the following matrix of pay-offs 
to different strategies:
Non-Agriculture
Production and 
Exchange
Rent-
Seeking
Agriculture Production and 
Exchange
(Ag) 200, 800 
(Non-Ag)
100,850
Rent-Seeking 250, 500 125, 600
In a classic prisoner’s dilemma, neither ‘party’ can be 
sure of the strategy that the other is going to pursue. 
Under such circumstances, rational independent 
decisions under uncertainty lead to an overall outcome 
that is fully satisfactory to neither (in the table above, 
pay-offs of 125 and 600 where both ‘parties’ rent-seek). 
Scrimgeour and Pasour, 1996’s argument is that, in the 
context of economy-wide reform (such that protection 
to industry was also going to be cut), farmers could also 
embrace reform – abandoning their own calls to 
protection and focusing on adjusting to the new terms 
on which they had to compete in world markets.
26 An alternative view is that later commentators have 
over-emphasised the role played in reform debates by 
FF. According to this view, they were not initially 
consulted about reform proposals and, when they were 
brought “into the loop”, they were told by Treasury to 
play a constructive game or face further cuts.
27 ‘Information about the direct and indirect effects of 
protectionist policies can influence public attitudes 
about the benefits of deregulation and help create a 
political climate conducive to institutional reform. … 
Economists in New Zealand helped to provide the 
intellectual basis to support reform through their 
analyses of various restrictions on competition, 
including agricultural programs.’ (p257, p265)
28 In China such caution was understandable: the 
generation of leaders in the late 1970s had, within the 
previous two decades, experienced two extraordinary 
national experiments - the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution - that brought chaos to the country.
29 The incoming Labour government was seen to have a 
much more coherent vision of what should be done to 
the economy as a whole than the National party, which, 
by the time it returned to power in 1990, had adopted 
many of the major policies of the Labour party.
30 Since 1989 Chile has been experiencing declining 
competitiveness in agriculture, particularly in 
traditional crops (eg. wheat, rice and oilseeds), due 
partly to the fall in world prices.
31 More generally in economic development, the 
appetite for drastic reform has been lessened by the 
experience in Russia and other transition economies 
where shock therapy was less successful than foreign 
advisors imagined. In marked contrast, the gradual 
reforms seen in China and India have been followed by 
dramatic increases in economic growth rates.
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